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Abstract: We examine how executives’ ability to control their firm’s exposure to risk affects the 
design of their incentive-compensation contracts. We use the introduction of exchanged-traded 
weather derivatives, which improved executives’ ability to control their firms’ exposure to weather 
risk, as a natural experiment. We find that executives for whom weather derivatives have the 
greatest impact on their ability to control their firm’s exposure to weather risk experience relative 
reductions in total compensation and equity incentives. The former finding is consistent with a 
reduction in the risk premium that executives receive for their exposure to weather risk. The latter 
finding suggests that risk and incentives are complements when executives can control their firms’ 
exposure to risk. Collectively, our results show that executives’ ability to control their firms’ 
exposure to risk alters the nature of agency conflicts and influences the design of their incentive-
compensation contracts.  
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1. Introduction 
The theoretical agency literature highlights the costs of agency conflicts that result when 
executives have information that principals do not (Lambert, 2001). Although providing 
executives with incentives tied to stock price can sometimes alleviate these agency conflicts, doing 
so exposes executives to risk that requires payment of a commensurate risk premium.  
Consequently, firms trade off the benefit of providing incentives against the cost of exposing 
executives to the associated risk. While this tradeoff leads to relatively straightforward predictions 
about the effect of risk on executives’ compensation, the effect of risk on executives’ incentives is 
theoretically ambiguous and depends on the extent to which executives can influence or “control” 
the outcome that is the source of the risk (Jenter, 2002; Prendergast, 2002; Hemmer, 2006, 2012; 
Edmans and Gabaix, 2011a). In particular, Edmans and Gabaix (2011a) predict that risk positively 
affects incentives when risk is controllable. Therefore, we examine how executives’ ability to 
control their firms’ exposure to risk affects the design of their incentive-compensation contracts. 
However, empirically identifying the effect of executives’ ability to control risk on the 
design of their incentive-compensation contracts is challenging for two reasons. First, risk and 
incentives are endogenously related (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999; 
Core and Guay, 2002a). A correlation between risk and features of executives’ compensation 
contracts does not necessarily reflect the causal effect of risk because boards are likely to design 
contracts based on factors unobservable to the researcher that also affect firm risk (e.g., executives’ 
risk tolerance). Second, it is difficult to decompose realized risk into controllable and 
uncontrollable portions. To overcome these challenges, we use the introduction of exchange-traded 
weather derivative contracts as a natural experiment that created arguably exogenous variation in 
executives’ ability to control their firms’ exposure to weather risk (Perez-Gonzalez and Yun, 2013).  
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Prior to the introduction of weather derivatives, it was difficult (i.e., costly, if at all feasible) 
for executives to alter their firms’ exposure to weather risk. Weather derivatives are a financial 
innovation that allowed executives to hedge for the first time, or, at a minimum, significantly 
reduced the cost of hedging weather risk (Perez-Gonzalez and Yun, 2013). Therefore, by bringing 
firms’ exposure to particular risks—at least in part—under executives’ control, executives’ 
newfound ability to hedge makes previously uncontrollable risks controllable from an agency-
theoretic perspective.1 Consequently, a change in executives’ ability to hedge should affect their 
incentive-compensation contracts in several important ways. 
First, the ability to hedge risk should affect the amount of executives’ annual compensation. 
A portion of executives’ annual compensation represents a risk-premium to compensate them for 
bearing the risk associated with their performance-based incentives and firm-specific human 
capital (see Core, Guay, and Larcker, 2003 for a review; see also Core and Guay, 2010 and 
Armstrong, Core, and Guay, 2017). If hedging allows executives to eliminate some of this risk, 
then they will be exposed to less firm-specific risk and, consequently, should demand and receive 
less of a risk premium in their annual pay. Accordingly, we expect the introduction of weather 
derivatives to cause a reduction in the annual compensation of more affected executives, relative 
to the change in compensation of less affected executives.  
Second, executives’ ability to hedge risk should also affect the design of their equity 
incentives. Although the prevailing view in the empirical literature is that risk should have a 
negative relation with executives’ equity incentives, several theoretical studies show that the 
relation is theoretically ambiguous (Holmstrom, 1979, 1982; Jenter, 2002; Hemmer, 2006, 2012; 
                                                 
1  In other words, an executive’s ability to hedge his firm’s exposure to a particular risk whose realization is 
“uncontrollable” in the sense of not being influenced by the executive’s actions essentially makes that risk 
“controllable” from shareholders’ perspective and, in turn, “controllable” from an agency-theoretic contract design 
perspective. We elaborate on the notion of “controllability” in Section 2.2. 
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Edmans and Gabaix, 2011a; Guo and Ou-Yang, 2015).2 The intuition for the theoretical ambiguity 
is simple: an executive’s actions can influence (or “control”) not only the mean of a performance 
measure (e.g., stock price), but they can also influence its variance (or risk).  
Models that predict a negative relation between risk and incentives typically assume that 
the moments of the outcome distribution are uncorrelated (e.g., normal). Consequently, the 
executive’s actions only affect the mean, but not the variance of the performance measure. Edmans 
and Gabaix (2011a) relax this assumption and allow executives’ actions to affect risk and find that 
doing so leads to a complementary relation between risk and incentives. Therefore, we expect that 
the introduction of weather derivatives, which increased the ability of executives to affect firm 
risk, will lead to a relative reduction in the equity incentives of more affected executives.  
A summary of our research design and empirical findings is as follows. Throughout our 
analyses, we use both traditional difference-in-differences designs and “fuzzy” difference-in-
differences designs that accommodate executives’ decision to hedge. First, consistent with Perez-
Gonzalez and Yun (2013) we find that the CEOs of firms with greater exposure to weather risk 
prior to the introduction of weather derivatives are more likely to use them to hedge this risk. In 
particular, these firms experienced a statistically significant and economically meaningful relative 
reduction in the covariance between their stock returns and weather outcomes following the 
introduction of weather derivatives. These firms also experienced a similar relative reduction in 
their idiosyncratic risk.3 We corroborate this indirect evidence of increased hedging by searching 
                                                 
2 Even though theoretical (e.g., Jenter, 2002; Hemmer, 2006, 2012) and empirical studies (e.g., Demsetz and Lehn, 
1985; Core and Guay, 1999, 2002a) have made this point, there is still a widespread belief that risk should have a 
negative relation with incentives. 
3 Weather events may entail both a systematic risk component (e.g., global warming) and an idiosyncratic risk 
component (e.g., localized weather conditions). We are unaware of any prior evidence about whether firms use 
weather derivatives to hedge idiosyncratic or systematic risk (or both). Consequently, we consider the type of risk that 
firms hedge with weather derivatives to be an unresolved empirical question. Our finding that the firms in our sample 
primarily hedge idiosyncratic risk provides evidence about this unresolved question.  
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our sample firms’ 10-K filings for references to weather derivative contracts and find that these 
firms are significantly more likely to discuss the use of these contracts. In total, we find that the 
introduction of weather derivatives led to an increase in affected managers’ ability to control their 
firms’ exposure to previously uncontrollable idiosyncratic risk.   
Second, we find that CEOs who use weather derivatives to reduce their firms’ exposure to 
weather risk subsequently receive relatively less total annual compensation—including both the 
cash and equity grant components. This relative reduction in annual compensation is consistent 
with a decrease in the risk premium that these CEOs both require and receive for having their 
wealth and human capital exposed to weather risk.  
Third, we find that CEOs who use weather derivatives to hedge their firms’ exposure to 
weather risk experience relative declines in their equity incentives. This finding, coupled with our 
evidence that these CEOs’ firms also experienced a significant relative reduction in their exposure 
to risk, is evidence of a positive, rather than a negative relation, between risk and incentives when 
executives can affect their firms’ exposure to risk.  
We contribute to the incentive-compensation and corporate hedging literatures in several 
ways. First, we bridge the gap between the theoretical agency and empirical contract design 
literatures by providing evidence that CEOs’ ability to alter their firms’ exposure to a source of 
previously uncontrollable risk affects the design of their incentive-compensation contracts. Much 
of the prior empirical research in this area has focused on how CEOs’ incentives influence their 
corporate risk-taking decisions (e.g., Agrawal and Mandelker, 1987; DeFusco et al., 1990; Guay, 
1999; Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2002; Coles et al., 2006; Low, 2009; Armstrong and Vashishtha, 
2012). We examine the converse: how firm risk affects the design of CEOs’ incentive-
compensation contracts.  
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Prior empirical studies that examine how risk affects the design of incentive-compensation 
contracts provide mixed evidence about the direction of the relation between risk and CEOs’ 
incentives (e.g., Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Lambert and Larcker, 1987; Garen, 1994; Bushman et 
al., 1996; Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999; Core and Guay, 1999; Gormley, Matsa, and Milbourn, 
2013; Armstrong, 2013). To the best of our knowledge, none of these prior studies considers how 
executives’ ability to control their firm’s exposure to risk affects their compensation and incentives. 
Moreover, some studies attribute the mixed evidence to the endogenous design of CEOs’ 
incentive-compensation contracts (Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999; Core and Guay, 2002a). We 
acknowledge this important concern and contribute to this literature by examining an exogenous 
shock to CEOs’ ability to hedge firm risk, which in turn allows us to estimate the effect of CEOs’ 
ability to hedge (or control) risk on their compensation and incentives.  
Second, our findings contribute to the literature on corporate hedging through our use of 
the introduction of weather derivatives as a research setting (e.g., Modigliani and Miller, 1958; 
Perez-Gonzalez and Yun, 2013; Gilje and Taillard, 2016). In particular, our paper adds to the 
evidence in Perez-Gonzalez and Yun (2013) that hedging can increase firm value by highlighting 
another channel through which hedging can do so: Hedging can reduce risk-averse and 
undiversified employees’ exposure to a source of risk that is otherwise outside of their control, and 
thereby mitigate costly agency conflicts and lead to a lower risk premium in employee 
compensation (Mayers and Smith, 1982; Stulz, 1984; Smith and Stulz, 1985). 
It is important to consider how our results might extrapolate beyond our research setting 
(Glaeser and Guay, 2017). On one hand, the economic magnitude of the effects that we document 
might represent a lower bound on the importance of executives’ ability to hedge risk because the 
utility industry is relatively stable, with relatively low inherent volatility. On the other hand, if 
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more risk-averse executives select into the utility industry (e.g., because they are attracted by its 
relative stability), then the economic magnitude of the effects that we document might be larger 
than those in other industries. Although these and other considerations make it difficult to 
confidently extrapolate the economic magnitude of our results to other settings, there is no obvious 
reason that the sign of the relation between controllable risk and incentives that we document is 
specific to our research setting. Instead, the positive relation that we document is consistent with 
agency-theoretic predictions, and with the well-known notion of the positive tradeoff between risk 
and (expected) return (e.g., Holmstrom, 1979, 1982; Jenter, 2002; Hemmer, 2006, 2012; Edman 
and Gabaix, 2011a; Sharpe 1966). 
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. We provide background information 
on weather derivatives and discuss related studies in Section 2. We describe our research design 
in Section 3 and discuss our sample, data sources, and variable measurement in Section 4. We 
present our primary results in Section 5 and the results of several supplemental analyses in Section 
6. We provide concluding remarks in Section 7.  
 
2. Background 
2.1. Weather derivatives 
Weather derivatives are financial contracts whose payoffs is determined by the realization 
of certain climatic conditions such as temperature and precipitation (e.g., rainfall and snowfall), or 
the occurrence of extreme events (e.g., hurricanes). A typical weather derivative contract specifies 
the following parameters: (i) an underlying weather measure (e.g., temperature or cumulative 
precipitation); (ii) the location at which the weather is measured (e.g., a weather measurement 
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station); (iii) the contract period; (iv) the exercise or “strike” price; and (v) a function that maps 
the realized weather measure to the contract’s monetary payout (Considine, 2000).  
The most common type of weather derivatives are temperature-based futures that come in 
one of two varieties: Heating Degree Day and Cooling Degree Day contracts (hereafter referred to 
as HDD and CDD, respectively). HDD and CDD capture—and can therefore be used to hedge—
the energy demand for heating and cooling services. The payoff to these contracts is based on the 
cumulative difference between the daily temperature and 65 degrees Fahrenheit (18 degrees 
Celsius) during a certain period of time (e.g., one month). The baseline temperature (i.e., 65 
degrees Fahrenheit) is set at a level at which there is relatively little demand for heating and cooling. 
HDD contracts pay off if the cumulative temperature is relatively low and, conversely, CDD 
contracts pay off if the cumulative temperature is relatively high.4 Figure 1 provides an example 
of a 10-K discussion of a weather derivative contract. 
Prior to the introduction of weather derivatives, firms with significant exposure to the 
weather had only a limited number of financial instruments with which they could hedge this risk. 
Moreover, previously available instruments, such as individual contracts with large property and 
casualty insurers, provided imperfect hedges and were typically very costly. For example, utilities 
could potentially use agriculture commodity futures to hedge weather risk because weather 
conditions also affect commodity prices and demand. However, agricultural commodity futures 
provide imperfect hedges and are subject to basis risk. Alternatively, utilities could potentially use 
a weather insurance contract from a property and casualty insurer to hedge weather risk. However, 
like most insurance contracts, weather insurance contracts only provide protection against 
                                                 
4 CDD = Max{0, 1/2*(Tmax+Tmin)-65} and HDD = Max{0, 65-1/2*(Tmax+Tmin)}, where Tmax and Tmin are the maximum 
and minimum temperature, respectively, measured in degrees Fahrenheit over a specific period. 
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catastrophic damage and do nothing to protect against reduced demand for heating or cooling when 
the weather is more moderate than expected.  
Weather derivatives also differ from conventional insurance contracts in several other 
important respects. First, weather derivatives are financial instruments with payoffs that are tied 
to objective, measurable weather events such as hours of sunshine, amount of precipitation, snow 
depth, temperature, or wind speed. Weather stations around the country measure these realizations, 
and the contracting parties cannot influence these realizations. Consequently, the contractual 
payoffs are difficult, if not impossible to manipulate. In contrast, insured parties can manipulate 
loss payments from conventional insurance contracts, giving rise to potentially significant moral 
hazard problems.  
Second, the loss settlement process for weather derivatives depends on measurements that 
are collected for other purposes and therefore represent a negligible marginal cost of contract 
settlement. In contrast, the settlement process for conventional insurance contracts usually entails 
costly investigation and verification at the loss site, and can even involve litigation. Third, credit 
risk is present with insurance contracts, although this risk is somewhat limited by monitoring from 
insurance regulators, external audits, and credit and claims-paying rating agencies. In contrast, 
many weather derivatives trade on exchanges, which virtually eliminates any credit risk.5 Fourth, 
exchange-traded weather derivatives incur relatively low transaction costs, making it feasible for 
firms to dynamically hedge their exposure. In contrast, insurance contracts cannot be traded and 
premature cancellation typically involves significant penalties and other transaction costs.  
Utilities can also potentially engage in “real actions” to hedge their firms’ risk. For example, 
a firm could diversify its operations across either product lines or geographic regions to reduce its 
                                                 
5 Although credit risk remains with over-the-counter weather risk trading, protection is provided by the International 
Securities and Derivatives Association and external audits of financial records. 
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total exposure to the weather. However, implementing these and other diversification strategies 
can be costly and prior studies question their efficacy (Berger and Ofek, 1995; Lamont and Polk, 
2002). Moreover, these and other types of “real actions” can also introduce additional agency 
conflicts between executives and shareholders. 
Finally, utilities may use regulatory measures to minimize weather risk. Specifically, a 
weather normalization adjustment (WNA) is a method of adjusting customers’ bills to reflect 
normal, rather than actual, weather conditions, which effectively allows utilities to reduce their 
exposure to weather risk. However, WNAs do not cover the unregulated portion of utilities’ 
business and are not available in every state. Moreover, the cash flow recovery from WNAs lags 
weather shocks, particularly in extreme cases, and their use is potentially subject to moral hazard 
on the part of consumers, as well as regulatory and political risk. To summarize, although there 
were ways that executives could reduce their firms’ exposure to weather risk prior to the 
introduction of weather derivatives, they were imperfect and costly, relative to weather derivatives.  
The first over-the-counter (OTC) weather derivative contract was introduced in 1997, 
primarily in response to severe and unexpected weather conditions caused by the 1997-98 El Nino-
Southern Oscillation (ENSO). According to the Weather Risk Management Association, the total 
value of weather derivative contracts traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange was about $8 
billion in 2003 and increased to roughly $45.2 billion by 2006.6 Not surprisingly, 70% of the end-
users of weather derivatives are members of the energy industry (WMRA, 2005).  
2.2 Controllability 
Lambert’s (2001, p. 23) defines an outcome as “controllable” if the agent’s actions or 
decisions influence its probability distribution. Conversely, “non-controllable” means that the 
                                                 
6 http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/weather/forecast/2008-06-09-weather-derivative_N.htm. 
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agent’s actions have no effect on the probability distribution of the outcome. However, there is an 
important distinction between controllability of (i) the stochastic outcome that is the source of risk 
is controllable, and (ii) exposure to the risky outcome. We generalize Lambert’s (2001) definition 
of controllable to include not only actions that directly affect the distribution of an outcome, but 
also actions that influence the firm’s exposure to the outcome (e.g., hedging). If a CEO can alter 
his firm’s exposure to a particular outcome that he cannot directly control, the outcome becomes 
“controllable” in the sense that is relevant from an agency-theoretic perspective.  
To illustrate this important distinction, consider a simple return generating process: 
Returni,t = α + βi * Factort + εi,t 
where Return is the firm’s equity market return, Factor is the realization of some stochastic 
variable that affects the firm’s return (which could be either idiosyncratic or systematic), and β is 
the sensitivity of the firm’s return to this stochastic factor. Even if CEOs cannot directly influence 
the realization of Factor, they may be able to control their firm’s exposure to the factor (i.e., β).  
In the context of our study, the introduction of weather derivatives provided affected 
executives with a newfound ability to alter their firm’s exposure to weather risk, or, at a minimum, 
significantly reduced the cost of altering their firm’s exposure to weather risk. Weather derivatives 
do not allow executives to directly influence the weather—and therefore did not affect the 
controllability of weather risk according to Lambert’s (2001) definition. However, weather 
derivatives did affect the controllability of weather risk under our broader definition because they 
increased executives’ ability to affect their firm’s exposure to weather risk. 
2.3. Risk and incentives 
Ross (2004) develops a framework to show how the properties of a compensation contract 
affect an agent’s preferences for risk. Suppose that a risk-averse manager who holds 𝑥 shares with 
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utility 𝑈(𝑥). Now instead of paying the manager 𝑥 directly, the manager receives a compensation 
contract (or fee schedule), f, that transforms the payoff such that the manager’s induced utility 
function as evaluated though the lens of the contract is 𝑉(𝑥) = 𝑈(𝑓(𝑥)). The change in the 
manager’s risk aversion induced by the compensation contract, f, is given by  
𝐴𝑉(𝑥) − 𝐴(𝑥) =  −
𝑈′′(𝑓)𝑓′
𝑈′(𝑓)
−
𝑓′
𝑓′′
− [−
𝑈′′(𝑥)
𝑈′(𝑥)
] 
𝐴𝑉(𝑥) − 𝐴(𝑥) = [𝐴(𝑓) − 𝐴(𝑥)] + 𝐴(𝑓)[𝑓
′ − 1] + 𝐴𝑓(𝑥) 
The right-hand-side consists of three terms that represent the following three effects: (i) the 
“translation effect,” [𝐴(𝑓) − 𝐴(𝑥)], which represents the shift in the domain of the manager’s 
utility function at which the payoff is evaluated; (ii) the “magnification effect,” 𝐴(𝑓)[𝑓′ − 1], 
which captures how the compensation contract “magnifies” the manager’s payoff by (𝑓′ − 1) at 
the point where the payoff is evaluated; and (iii) the “convexity effect,” 𝐴𝑓(𝑥), which captures the 
shape of the contract’s payoff.  
Ross (2004) uses this framework to show, inter alia, that although call options have a 
positive translation and convexity effect, they also have a positive magnification effect which, if 
sufficiently large, can outweigh the former two effects and can make an executive more risk-averse 
(e.g., Lambert, Larcker, and Verrecchia, 1991). Similar to the ambiguity of the relation between 
options and risk taking, the relation beteween incentives and risk taking is theoretically ambiguous 
and may depend on specific modeling asusmptions. 
Empirical contracting studies that predict a negative relation between risk and incentives 
typically appeal to Holmstrom (1979) and Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987). We describe the 
“stylized” agency model inspired by these papers and the conditions that generate a negative 
relation between risk and incentives in Appendix II. Edmans and Gabaix (2011b) discuss how their 
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model builds on the stylized model (p. 2,896): “Our framework develops a quite different set of 
sufficient conditions, which may be satisfied in many settings in which the [stylized model’s] 
assumptions do not hold and tractability was previously believed to be unattainable. In addition, 
while the [stylized model’s] setup delivers linear contracts, our setting also accommodates convex 
and concave contracts.”7 Edmans and Gabaix (2011a) extend this framework by adding a talent 
assignment problem and show that when the agent can affect risk, a positive relation between risk 
and incentives emerges.  
The theoretical ambiguity of the relation between risk and incentives is one potential 
explanation for the mixed evidence in prior empirical studies. For example, Demsetz and Lehn 
(1985), Core and Guay (2002a), and Oyer and Shaefer (2005) present evidence of a positive 
relation between risk and incentives, while Lambert and Larcker (1987), Aggarwal and Samwick 
(1999), and Jin (2002) find evidence of a negative relation. Further complicating inferences, 
studies such as Garen (1994), Yermack (1995), Bushman, Indejikian, and Smith (1996), and Ittner, 
Larcker, and Rajan (1997) find no significant relation between risk and incentives.8  
2.4. Corporate hedging 
 Under a restrictive set of assumptions, Modigliani and Miller (1958) demonstrate that 
corporate hedging is, at best, a value-neutral activity. However, the prevalence of corporate 
hedging and insurance is striking (Mayers and Smith, 1982). Motivated by the widespread 
                                                 
7 The technical reasons largely relate to the validity of the so-called first-order approach (FOA), which is frequently 
invoked as a way to solve the bi-level optimization that characterizes principal-agent models. The FOA replaces the 
first-order condition for the optimum of the agent’s incentive compatibility (IC) constraint in the principal’s objective 
function to produce a “relaxed” and more tractable formulation of the problem. Several authors (e.g., Mirlees, 1974; 
Rogerson, 1984; Jewitt, 1988) have characterized the restrictive conditions that are necessary to ensure the validity of 
the FOA. Two of the more well-known conditions are the Convexity of the Distribution Function Condition (CDFC) 
and the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Condition (MLRC). However, as Hemmer (2006) notes, distributions that satisfy 
these conditions typically do not yield tractable solutions or capture the empirical properties of the parameters of 
interests (e.g., stock price); nor are they easily ranked in terms of riskiness based on simple summary statistics.  
8 Studies in other settings that involve sharecroppers and franchisees generally find either a positive or no significant 
relation between risk and incentives (Prendergast, 1999 and 2002 review these literatures). 
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incidence of corporate hedging and insurance, subsequent authors have relaxed the Modigliani-
Miller assumptions and have offered several potential explanations for corporate hedging, 
including (i) reducing the cost of financial distress and bankruptcy (Smith and Stulz, 1985; Mayers 
and Smith, 1990; Bessembinder, 1991; Géczy, Minton, and Schrand, 1997; Haushalter, 2000), (ii) 
reducing underinvestment (Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein, 1993; Gay and Nam, 1998), (iii) reducing 
tax liabilities (Mayers and Smith, 1982; Smith and Stulz, 1985; Graham and Rogers, 2002), (iv) 
speculating (Géczy, Minton, and Schrand, 2007), (v) rent extraction by entrenched executives 
(Kumar and Rabinovitch, 2013), and (vi) reducing the risk premium that undiversified employees 
demand for their exposure to firm–specific idiosyncratic risk (Stulz, 1984; Smith and Stulz, 1985). 
Our study adds to this literature by using the introduction of weather derivatives to examine how 
executives’ ability to hedge risk affects the design of their incentive-compensation contracts.  
 While Perez-Gonzalez and Yun (2013) focus on the first two of the aforementioned 
channels to explain the implications of corporate hedging for firm value, our interest lies in the 
last two channels (i.e., while they focus on how hedging can reduce the costs of financial distress 
and underinvestment, we focus on the agency-theoretic channels of affecting rent extraction by 
entrenched executives and reducing the risk premium undiversified employees demand for their 
exposure to firm-specific idiosyncratic risk).  
On one hand, entrenched executives may use hedging to reduce their firm’s—and, in turn, 
their own—exposure to idiosyncratic risk at the expense of well-diversified shareholders. This 
would undermine the efficacy of their compensation incentives and should result in a “reloading” 
of these incentives and increased compensation and incentives. On the other hand, hedging can 
reduce employees’ human capital and compensation exposure to uncontrollable risk, mitigating 
costly agency conflicts and reducing the risk premium in employee compensation. This would 
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result in reduced compensation and incentives. In total, the relation between hedging and 
incentives is theoretically ambiguous. 
 
3. Research Design 
The introduction of weather derivatives in 1997 provided firms with an efficient way to 
hedge (i.e., control) their exposure to weather risk. Importantly, the introduction of weather 
derivatives was arguably exogenous with respect to any particular firm and with respect to 
executives’ expectations about the outcomes that we examine (i.e., selection is unlikely to be a 
concern in our setting). Further, we expect the benefit of weather derivatives to increase in firms’ 
historical exposure to weather conditions.  
3.1. The effect of hedging weather risk on the design of incentive-compensation contracts 
3.1.1. Traditional difference-in-differences  
We use the introduction of weather derivatives as an arguably exogenous source of 
variation in executives’ ability to control their firms’ exposure to weather risk. We first examine 
its effect on executives’ compensation by estimating the following traditional difference-in-
differences specification: 
               Compensationit = β0,it + β1,itAftert × Treatmenti + γ'Xit + FirmFE + YearFE + εit                    (1) 
where i and t index firms and time, respectively. X represents a vector of control variables, which 
we discuss in more detail below. FirmFE denotes firm fixed effects, which are included to abstract 
away from (i.e., “control for”) time-invariant features of firms and firms’ contracting environments 
(e.g., industry membership). Similarly, YearFE denotes year fixed effects, which are included to 
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abstract away from systematic temporal effects (e.g., ENSO).9 After is an indicator that equals one 
from 1998 onwards and zero otherwise, and delineates the post-introduction period.  
Treatment measures the degree to which the introduction of weather derivatives affected 
firm i. Weather derivatives likely had the greatest impact on firms with greater historical exposure 
to weather risk since they would have made more risk controllable by these firms. Therefore, we 
define Treatment as several different measures of firms’ historical (i.e., pre-1997) exposure to 
variation in weather conditions.  
 The coefficient β1 in Eq. (1) provides an estimate of the average treatment effect (ATE) of 
the introduction of weather derivatives on Compensation as long as the four difference-in-
differences assumptions are satisfied. Although these assumptions are crucial for estimating causal 
effects, they are frequently unstated, despite the increasing prevalence of difference-in-differences 
designs. Given the importance of these assumptions for credible causal inference, we now discuss 
them in the context of our research setting.10  
Assumption 1: Common (or “parallel”) trends in outcomes. This assumption implies that 
treated firms would have had the same change in outcomes as untreated firms had they not received 
the treatment.11 In our setting, the parallel trends assumption is satisfied as long as changes in 
Treatment are otherwise exogenous with respect to changes in CEOs’ compensation contracts after 
the introduction of weather derivatives. Because treatment firms’ outcomes in the absence of 
treatment are counterfactual (and therefore unobservable), the parallel trends assumption is 
inherently untestable. However, we explicitly test whether the treatment and control firms had 
                                                 
9 Note that the main effects of After and Treatment are absorbed by the time- and firm-fixed effects, respectively. 
10 Note that the discussion refers to a binary treatment for ease of exposition. The case of a continuous treatment relies 
on analogous assumptions (Blundell and Dias, 2009). 
11  The parallel trends assumption in difference-in-differences replaces the exclusion restriction in instrumental 
variables, which requires that the treatment is (conditionally) mean independent of the level of the potential outcomes, 
with the weaker assumption that the treatment is (conditionally) mean independent of the change in potential outcomes. 
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different trends in the pre-treatment period in Section 6. This falsification test provides assurance 
that the parallel trends assumption is not violated in our setting by demonstrating that our results 
are not an artefact of differential pre-treatment trends, and by demonstrating that our results only 
obtain around the introduction of weather derivatives (e.g., if we define treatment as occurring in 
1995, we do not find similar results).   
Assumption 2: The stable unit treatment value assumption (“SUTVA”). SUTVA requires 
that the treatment status of one firm does not affect other firms’ potential outcomes. In our setting, 
SUTVA implies that the decision by some firms to hedge their weather risk does not affect the 
incentive-compensation contracts of executives at other firms. Like the parallel trends assumption, 
SUTVA is inherently untestable because treated and untreated firms’ counterfactual outcomes are 
unobservable. However, SUTVA is unlikely to be violated in our setting because our sample firms 
do not directly affect the realized weather, but rather adjust their exposure to the weather. 
Assumption 3: No effect of treatment on the pre-treatment populations (“NEPT”). NEPT 
requires that firms did not adjust their pre-treatment outcome in anticipation of receiving the 
treatment. In our setting, NEPT implies that firms did not adjust their CEO’s compensation 
contracts prior to the introduction of weather derivatives in anticipation of being able to use 
weather derivatives in the future. Because the weather derivative market developed largely in 
response to the unexpected severity of the 1997-98 ENSO event, it is unlikely that firms foresaw 
the advent of this market. Moreover, even if firms had foreseen the development of weather 
derivatives, they are unlikely to have altered their CEOs’ incentive-compensation contracts in 
anticipation. Nevertheless, we explicitly test for differential changes in outcomes prior to the 
introduction of weather derivatives in Section 6 and find no evidence that this assumption is 
violated in our setting. 
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Assumption 4: Perfect compliance. Perfect compliance requires that no firms received the 
treatment in the pre-treatment period and that all firms in the treatment group—and only those 
firms—received the treatment in the post-treatment period. In the case of linear treatments, perfect 
compliance requires that treatment is a deterministic function of the treatment variable. In our 
setting, perfect compliance would be violated if some firms in the treatment group did not hedge 
or if some firms in the control group did hedge. This assumption may not be satisfied in our setting 
because firms in the treatment group were not required to hedge their weather risk and firms in the 
control group were not precluded from hedging their weather risk using weather derivatives.  
When there is imperfect compliance, the β1 coefficient in Eq. (1) captures a weighted 
average of (i) zero effect for firms that do not comply with treatment, and (ii) the effect of the 
treatment on firms that do comply (Blundell and Dias, 2009). Consequently, the treatment effect 
estimated by β1 will not correspond to the local average treatment effect (LATE) or the ATE. 
Instead, β1 will capture the relative effect of introducing weather derivatives on the treated. 
Therefore, β1 is analogous to an intention to treat (ITT) estimate that is frequently of interest in the 
epidemiology literature. The ITT captures both firms that hedge (i.e., took the medicine) because 
the introduction of weather derivatives “nudged them” into doing so, and firms that did not change 
their behavior. In light of the possibility—and indeed, the likelihood—of imperfect compliance in 
our setting, we develop an alternative identification strategy based on “fuzzy” difference-in-
differences to estimate the LATE that captures the effect of controlling risk on the subsample of 
compliers. 
3.1.2. Fuzzy difference-in-differences 
Many natural experiments are not amenable to the traditional difference-in-differences 
framework because either the treatment or control groups (or both) exhibit imperfect compliance. 
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In this case, there are no “sharp” treatment and control groups, but only “fuzzy” treatment and 
control groups that differ in their members’ probability of compliance.12 In our setting, firms can 
be classified into four categories that correspond to those in Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin’s (1996) 
framework:  
(i) firms that reduce their exposure to (i.e., hedge) weather risk because of the 
introduction of weather derivatives (“compliers”),  
(ii) firms that never reduce their exposure to (i.e., hedge) weather risk either before or 
after the introduction of weather derivatives (“never-takers”),  
(iii) firms that reduce their exposure to (i.e., hedge) weather risk both before and after 
the introduction of weather derivatives (“always-takers”), and  
(iv) firms that increase their exposure to (i.e., speculate on) weather risk because of the 
introduction of weather derivatives (“defiers”).  
Traditional difference-in-differences requires the treatment and control groups to be composed 
entirely of compliers and never-takers, respectively. Traditional differences-in-differences 
compares the pre- and post-treatment outcomes (i.e., the first difference) between the treatment 
and control groups (i.e., the second differences). The pre- and post-treatment status for the 
treatment and control groups—which are composed entirely of compliers and never-takers, 
respectively—must be (0,1) and (0,0). In other words, in the case of linear treatment effects, 
traditional difference-in-differences requires that treatment status is a deterministic function of the 
                                                 
12 It is likely the case that very few natural experiments involve perfect compliance. For example, two widely cited 
natural experiments are the Vietnam military draft lottery and the mandatory adoption of IFRS. However, in both 
settings, compliance is likely imperfect. Individuals may be able to avoid military service even when drafted and firms 
may use loopholes to avoid an IFRS mandate. Similarly, undrafted individuals may still voluntarily enlist in the 
military and drafted individuals may enlist prior to being drafted. Firms in non-IFRS countries could still voluntarily 
prepare IFRS-compliant reports, and firms in IFRS countries could voluntarily prepare IFRS-compliant reports prior 
to the mandate. Any of these behaviors is sufficient to violate the perfect compliance assumption.  
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treatment. The presence of never-takers and always-takers in our sample implies the absence of 
the “sharp” treatment and control groups which, in turn, results in a biased estimate of the average 
treatment effect.  
To address this issue, we modify the difference-in-differences specification given by Eq. 
(1) to model the differential probability of treatment status using the following two-stage 
estimation: 
               Weather Riskit = α0,it + α1,itAftert × Treatmenti + λ'Xit + FirmFE + YearFE + εit                    (2a)  
Compensationit = θ0,it + θ1,itPredicted Weather Riskit + μ'Xit + FirmFE + YearFE + uit                    (2b) 
Eq. (2a) uses Aftert × Treatmenti as an instrument for the endogenous variable, Weather Riskit. Eq. 
(2b) uses the fitted values of Weather Riskit from Eq. (2a) to instrument for treatment status in a 
difference-in-differences specification. Eqs. (2a) and (2b) essentially combine instrumental 
variables and traditional difference-in-differences estimators to produce a “fuzzy” difference-in-
differences estimator.  
The coefficient θ1 in the second-stage Eq. (2b) is the Wald-DID estimator, and 
demonstrates the equivalence between fuzzy difference-in-differences and traditional difference-
in-differences coupled with instrumental variables: 
                                                Wald-DID =
𝐷𝐼𝐷𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝐷𝐼𝐷𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
                                                      (2c) 
where the DID of a random variable Z is given by 𝐷𝐼𝐷𝑧 = [E(𝑍𝑡2,𝑔𝑡) − 𝐸(𝑍𝑡1,𝑔𝑡)] − [E(𝑍𝑡2,𝑔𝑐) −
𝐸(𝑍𝑡1,𝑔𝑐)]; t0 and t1 denote the pre- and post-treatment periods; gt and gc denote the treatment and 
control groups; and E(.) is the expectation operator. The numerator of the Wald-DID in Eq. (2c) 
captures the effect of the instrument (i.e., Aftert × Treatmenti) on the average outcome and is 
equivalent to the β1 coefficient from the traditional (or “sharp”) difference-in-differences 
specification given by Eq. (1). The denominator captures the proportion of the population that 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2896147
- 21 - 
 
responds to the treatment (i.e., the proportion of compliers), and is equivalent to the α1 coefficient 
in Eq. (2a).   
Fuzzy difference-in-differences entails three significant departures from traditional (or 
“sharp”) difference-in-differences (Hudson, Hull, and Liebersohn, 2017). First, fuzzy difference-
in-differences relaxes the perfect compliance assumption. Second, fuzzy difference-in-differences 
estimates a LATE rather than the ATE. In our setting, the LATE corresponds to the causal effect 
of controlling weather risk on compliers (Angrist et al., 1996; Blundell and Dias, 2009). 13 
Consequently, Eq. (1) estimates the effect of the introduction of weather derivatives, which 
corresponds to the “intention to treat” (ITT) estimate, while Eq. (2) estimates the effect of using 
weather derivatives to hedge risk, which corresponds to the “treatment effect” estimate.  
The third significant departure is that fuzzy difference-in-differences requires two 
additional identifying assumptions:  
Assumption 5: Monotonicity. In our setting, monotonicity implies that the introduction of 
weather derivatives did not make some firms increase their exposure to weather risk (i.e., that there 
are no defiers). Similar to the parallel trends and SUTVA assumptions, monotonicity relates to 
how firms would have behaved in the absence of treatment. As is the case for all counterfactual 
assumptions, monotonicity is inherently untestable. However, it is unlikely that utilities used 
weather derivatives to increase their exposure to weather risk because these are the firms that are 
                                                 
13 The LATE may not correspond to the treatment effect for either the always-takers or the never-takers if there are 
heterogeneous treatment effects. Typically, always-takers voluntarily choose treatment because they expect to benefit 
from doing so and, conversely, never-takers avoid treatment because they do not expect to benefit (e.g., Heckman, 
Urzua, and Vytlacil, 2006). Hence, the LATE may be the most informative treatment effect since it is an estimate of 
the effect of treatment on firms that are on the margin between choosing and avoiding the treatment. In other words, 
it is rarely informative to know the effect of treatment on never-takers since they would be expected to take actions to 
avoid doing so. Similarly, understanding the effect of treatment on always-takers is rarely informative because always-
takers are unlikely to change their behavior. 
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most exposed to this source of risk.14 Therefore, monotonicity is likely to be valid in our setting. 
This is also an important benefit of focusing on utilities, as the monotonicity assumption would 
likely be violated in a larger, more heterogeneous sample of firms. Nonetheless, even if 
monotonicity is violated, estimates of the treatment effect will be attenuated as long as the effect 
of increasing and decreasing hedging is symmetric (Heckman et al., 2006). 
Assumption 6: Instrument relevance. This assumption requires that the differential 
probability of treatment for the treated group relative to the control group is significant enough to 
avoid “weak instrument” problems. An instrument’s relevance can be assessed by examining the 
test statistics on the α1 coefficient from the first-stage given by Eq. (2a). In our fuzzy difference-
in-differences tests, we follow Stock and Yogo (2005) to assess the relevance of Aftert × 
Treatmenti as an instrument.
15 
 
4. Sample Selection and Variable Measurement 
4.1. Sample selection  
The sample period for our primary tests spans the five years prior to and the five years 
following the introduction of weather derivatives (1993 – 2002). We start with 370 unique utilities 
that engaged in the generation or distribution of electricity or natural gas (Standard Industrial 
Classification Codes 4911, 4923, 4924, 4931 and 4932). We then require the following information 
                                                 
14 Note that the presence of some firms that increase their exposure to weather risk following the introduction of 
weather derivatives does not necessarily imply a violation of the monotonicity assumption. As long as these firms did 
not increase their exposure to weather risk because of the introduction of weather derivatives, monotonicity is not 
violated. A violation of monotonicity requires that these firms would not have increased their exposure to weather risk 
and only did so because of the introduction of weather derivatives. 
15 The monotonicity and instrument relevance assumptions are necessary because fuzzy difference-in-differences 
relies on instrumental variables to model relative compliance. Instrumental variables estimators also assume that the 
exclusion restriction is satisfied. In our setting, the exclusion restriction requires that Aftert × Treatmenti only affects 
changes in executive compensation through its effect on changes in firms’ exposure to weather risk. This assumption 
is equivalent to the parallel trends assumption. 
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for each firm: (i) the location of the firm’s headquarters (we lose 49 firms), (ii) at least ten years 
of quarterly data prior to 1997 to estimate the firm’s historical weather exposure (we lose 68 firms), 
(iii) valid historical temperature measurements in the firm’s county from the North America Land 
Data Assimilation System,16 (iv) Execucomp data to calculate incentive-compensation measures 
(we lose 45 firms), and (v) financial information from Compustat and CRSP. We also require that 
the firm has at least one year of data before and after the introduction of weather derivatives for 
the difference-in-differences specification (we lose 96 firms). Our final sample consists of 112 
unique utility firms and 899 firm-year observations.  
4.2. Treatment firms 
We use a continuous treatment variable, defined as the sensitivity of firms’ revenue to 
weather fluctuations prior to the introduction of weather derivatives. The introduction of weather 
derivatives had a larger effect on firms with greater historical sensitivity to weather fluctuations 
because weather derivatives allowed these firms to control more of their exposure to risk. 
Following Perez-Gonzalez and Yun (2013), we estimate the following specification: 
Rev/Assetsit = β0,i + β1,i EDDit+ γi ln(Assetsit) + εit                                                               (3) 
where Rev/Assetsit is quarterly revenue scaled by ending total assets. EDD proxies for total energy 
demand and is the sum of daily CDD and HDD in each quarter. CDD and HDD are calculated as 
Max{0, 65-½*(Tmax+Tmin)} and Max{0, ½*(Tmax+Tmin)-65}, respectively.
17 We measure EDD at 
the firm’s headquarters. 18  Tmax and Tmin are the maximum and minimum daily temperature 
                                                 
16 Available from Center for Disease Control and Prevention: http://wonder.cdc.gov/nasa-nldas.html.  
17 We obtain similar results when we use CDD or HDD as a measure of energy demand. 
18 Compustat reports the address of a firm’s current principal executive office, which could be different from its 
historical address if the firm has changed the location of its headquarters. To address potential errors in headquarter 
locations, we extract historical headquarter locations from the firm’s historical 10-K filings available on the SEC’s 
Edgar database. If the historical 10-K is not available for a particular year, we use the 10-K from the closest year that 
is available. 
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measured in degrees Fahrenheit, respectively. We also include the natural logarithm of total assets 
as a measure of firm size control for fluctuations in revenue due to sources other than the weather.  
We estimate Eq. (3) separately for each firm in our sample using quarterly Compustat data 
from 1980 to 1997. The estimated coefficient β1 captures the sensitivity of revenue to variation in 
energy demand. Treatment measures treatment intensity and is defined as the product of the 
absolute value of the estimated beta (|𝛽1|̂ ) and the historical standard deviation of EDD (𝜎𝐸𝐷𝐷) 
during the 1980-1997 estimation period, multiplied by 100 to ease interpretation.19 Treatment 
captures firms’ historical revenue volatility due to weather fluctuations. 
 4.3. Measurement of compensation and incentives 
We examine attributes of CEOs’ incentive-compensation contracts using data from the 
Execucomp database. The first seven measures are related to the composition (or “mix”) and 
magnitude (or “level”) of CEOs’ annual compensation and are (i) Log Total Comp, the natural 
logarithm of total annual compensation (i.e., salary, bonus, restricted stock and option grants, and 
long-term incentive plan payouts); (ii) Log Cash Comp, the natural logarithm of the sum of annual 
salary and bonus payments; (iii) Log Salary, the natural logarithm of the sum of annual salary; (iv) 
Log Bonus, the natural logarithm of bonus payments; (v) Log LTIP, the natural logarithm of long-
term incentive pay; (vi) Log Equity Comp, the natural logarithm of the adjusted Black-Scholes 
value of option and restricted stock grants received during the year, and (vii) EquityMix, defined 
as Equity Comp divided by Total Comp.  
In addition to these seven measures of CEOs’ annual (or “flow”) compensation, we also 
examine two common measures of their equity portfolio incentives: (i) Portfolio Delta, which 
captures the sensitivity of a CEO’s equity portfolio value to changes in stock price, and (ii) 
                                                 
19 Since utilities can benefit from hedging weather risk irrespective of the sign of these betas, the absolute value of the 
beta is informative about firms’ hedging opportunities. We consider alternative measures of Treatment in Section 6. 
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Portfolio Vega, which captures the sensitivity of a CEO’s equity portfolio value to changes in 
volatility of stock returns. We follow prior literature (e.g., Core and Guay, 1999; Coles, Daniel, 
and Naveen, 2006; Burns and Kedia, 2006) and measure Portfolio Delta as the natural logarithm 
of the change in the risk-neutral (Black-Scholes) value of the CEO’s equity portfolio for a 1% 
change in the firm’s stock price and Portfolio Vega as the natural logarithm of the change in the 
risk-neutral (Black-Scholes) value of the CEO’s equity portfolio for a 0.01 change in the risk of 
the company’s stock (measured by standard deviation of the firm’s return).20,21 
We include the following control variables identified by prior research (e.g., Core, 
Holthausen, and Larcker, 1999; Core, Guay, and Larcker, 2008): CEO Tenure measured as the 
natural logarithm of one plus the number of years the executive has held the CEO title; Firm Size 
measured as the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets; Firm Age measured as the natural 
logarithm of one plus number of years since stock price data for the firm becomes available from 
CRSP; the Book-to-Market ratio is included to capture growth opportunities; and ROA and Stock 
Return to measure firms’ accounting and stock market performance, respectively.  
Perez-Gonzalez and Yun (2013) find that firms with greater historical exposure to weather 
risk increased their leverage and investment following the introduction of weather derivatives. 
                                                 
20 We calculate the parameters of the Black-Scholes formula as follows. Annualized volatility is calculated using 
continuously compounded monthly returns over the previous 60 months, with a minimum of twelve months of returns, 
and winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentiles. If the stock has traded for less than one year, we use the imputed average 
volatility of the firms in the Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 1500. The risk-free rate is calculated using the interpolated 
interest rate on a Treasury Note with the same maturity (to the closest month) as the remaining life of the option, 
multiplied by 0.70 to account for the prevalence of early exercise. Dividend yield is calculated as the dividends paid 
during the previous twelve months scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the month. This is essentially the 
method described by Core and Guay (2002b). 
21 An alternative to the dollar-holdings measure of the incentive to increase stock price is the fractional-holdings 
measure, calculated as the change in the (risk-neutral) value of the executive’s equity portfolio for a $1,000 change in 
firm value (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). Baker and Hall (2004) and Core, Guay, and Larcker (2003) discuss how the 
suitability of each measure is context-specific and depends on how the CEO’s actions affect firm value. When the 
CEO’s actions affect the dollar returns of the firm (e.g., consuming perquisites), fractional holdings is a more 
appropriate measure of incentives. When the CEO’s actions affect the percentage returns of the firm (e.g., strategic 
decisions), dollar holdings are a more appropriate measure of incentives. Since we are concerned about strategic 
actions that affect the firm’s risk profile, we rely on the dollar-holdings measure of incentives. 
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Their findings therefore provide evidence that hedging increased shareholder value for reasons 
other than by reducing agency conflicts. We extend their findings by arguing that hedging can also 
affect agency frictions and that both agency and non-agency explanations can account for changes 
in firm value. Therefore, it is important for us to show that the effects we document are above and 
beyond the non-agency explanations documented in Perez-Gonzalez and Yun (2013). To do so, 
we control for (i) Leverage, measured as the sum of short- and long-term debt minus cash holdings, 
scaled by total assets, and (ii) capital expenditures (CAPEX), measured as annual capital 
expenditures scaled by total assets. Inclusion of these controls ensures that any changes in 
executives’ compensation and incentives that we document are attributable to the change in firms’ 
ability to hedge rather than changes in these corporate attributes. A more detailed description of 
the variables can be found in Appendix I. 
4.4. Measurement of weather derivative usage and weather risk 
Our difference-in-differences tests rely on the assumption that firms with greater historical 
weather exposure engaged in more hedging following the introduction of weather derivatives. We 
assess the validity of this assumption in two ways. First, we hand collect information about firms’ 
use weather derivatives after 1997 to gauge the extent of derivative hedging. We use a web 
crawling program to search for weather derivative keywords in every quarterly and annual report 
filed by our sample firms during the 1997 to 2002 period. We use the following keywords that are 
unique to weather derivative hedging to infer weather derivative usage: “Weather Derivative”, 
“Cooling Degree Day”, “Heating Degree Day”, “CDD”, and “HDD.” If a firm-year’s reports do 
not contain any of these hedging keywords, we classify that firm-year as nonuser.22  
                                                 
22 We do not use the notional value of hedging instruments because SFAS 133, which requires firms to recognize all 
derivatives as either assets or liabilities in the statement of financial position and measure those instruments at their 
fair value, was introduced in late 2000. 
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Second, we assess whether the sensitivity of firms’ equity returns to weather realizations 
declined following the introduction of weather derivatives. To obtain an annual measure of firms’ 
exposure to weather risk, we estimate the following model of each firm’s daily stock returns over 
a one-year period as a function of the three Fama-French factors and a daily measure of weather 
realizations: 
Reti,t = β0 + β1Sizet + β2Hmlt + β3Mktt + β4EDDt + εi,t    (4) 
where i indexes firms and t indexes time and EDD is the sum of HDD. We refer to the coefficient 
β4 as a firm’s “weather beta,” or Beta-FF. We also estimate a variant of Eq. (4) that includes a 
momentum factor to obtain an alternative measure of weather beta, which we refer to as Beta-
FFM. 
It is important to note that utilities can potentially benefit from hedging weather risk 
irrespective of the sign of their weather beta. For example, some firms may benefit from 
abnormally cold weather, whereas others may be adversely affected by cold weather conditions. 
Therefore, the absolute value of the estimated coefficient β4 captures the sensitivity of the firm’s 
equity returns to weather fluctuations. We also multiply the absolute value of the estimated weather 
betas by the annualized volatility of EDD to obtain an alternative measure of weather risk that 
captures the proportion of a firm’s stock return volatility that is attributable to weather exposure. 
We refer to these alternative measures as Risk-FF and Risk-FFM. We use each of the four measures 
of weather risk and the measure of derivative usage as dependent variables in the first-stage 
regression given by Eq. (2a). 
4.5. Descriptive statistics 
 Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for our sample. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 0.5% percentile in each tail. Panel A reports descriptive statistics for different 
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measures of weather risk. The Fama-French three-factor model and the Carhart (1997) four-factor 
model both produce similar estimates. In particular, Panel A shows that the average return 
sensitivity to weather is 0.75 and that weather betas exhibit substantial dispersion (standard 
deviations of 0.86 and 0.90 when calculated with the three- and four-factor models, respectively). 
These estimates indicate that the utilities in our sample have relatively large average exposure to 
the weather and exhibit substantial variation in their exposures. Our measure of historical revenue 
volatility attributable to weather fluctuations, Treatment, also exhibits substantial dispersion: its 
standard deviation is 2.94, compared to its mean of 2.22. 
Panel B of Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for compensation and incentive variables 
and Panel C of Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for firm and CEO characteristics. We compare 
these descriptive statistics to average values in the Execucomp and Compustat databases because 
our sample firms are drawn from a relatively unique industry. The differences that we document 
are similar to those in prior studies that examine utilities (e.g., Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2002; Jin and 
Jorion, 2006; Perez-Gonzalez and Yun, 2013). 
4.6. Sensitivity of stock returns to weather 
We examine whether firms adjust their exposure to weather risk following the introduction 
of weather derivatives in Panel D of Table 1. The results in column (1) show that firms’ tendency 
to use weather derivatives is increasing in their treatment intensity.23 Though it is unlikely that 
utilities used weather derivatives to speculate rather than hedge their exposure to weather risk, we 
address this potential issue by examining the impact of the introduction of weather derivatives on 
their weather-related risk exposures and overall return volatilities.  
                                                 
23 Column (1) presents estimates from a linear probability model. We obtain similar results when we estimate a logit 
model with industry and year fixed effects. Due to the “incidental parameters problem,” the logit specification does 
not accommodate firm fixed effects. 
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Columns (2) through (5) present results from estimating the sensitivity of our sample firms’ 
equity returns to weather realizations. The two sets of columns report estimates for weather risk 
based on the Fama-French three factor model and the four factor model that also includes a 
momentum factor. The results from both specifications indicate that firms’ relative exposure to 
(i.e., co-movement with) weather fluctuations following the introduction of weather derivatives is 
decreasing in their treatment intensity. Moreover, the economic magnitude of the relative reduction 
in risk for a one standard deviation increase in treatment intensity is large: when weather risk is 
calculated using the modified Fama-French model, the relative reduction in exposure to weather 
is 16% of the sample mean.  
Stochastic weather events may entail both a systematic risk component (e.g., global 
warming) and an idiosyncratic risk component (e.g., localized weather conditions). In Columns (6) 
to (8), we examine whether firms use weather derivatives to hedge idiosyncratic or systematic risk 
(or both). Column (6) presents results for total risk, measured as the natural logarithm of firms’ 
total stock return volatility and Columns (7) and (8) present results using the systematic and 
idiosyncratic components. We find that both total and idiosyncratic stock return volatility are 
decreasing in the treatment intensity following the introduction of weather derivatives. Overall, 
our evidence suggests that our sample firms used weather derivatives to hedge and experienced a 
meaningful reduction in their exposure to weather risk. 
 
5. Results 
5.1. Traditional difference-in-differences 
5.1.1. CEO compensation  
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Our next set of tests examines whether several aspects of CEOs’ annual compensation 
changed following the introduction of weather derivatives. The results reported in column (1) of 
Table 2 indicate that for one standard deviation increase in treatment intensity, total annual 
compensation declined by roughly 11.1% following the introduction of weather derivatives (t-
statistic of -4.13).  
We decompose the change in compensation into changes in its cash components in 
Columns (2) to (5) and its equity components in Columns (6) to (7). In Columns (2) to (5), we find 
that the decline in total annual compensation is largely attributable to a reduction in its cash 
component and especially the bonus component.24 This decline in total annual compensation is 
consistent with our prediction that weather derivatives allow executives to hedge risk that they 
would have otherwise had to bear and for which they would have demanded a risk-premium (Core 
and Guay, 2010; Conyon, Core, and Guay, 2011). In Appendix II, we show that hedging can 
increase a CEO’s expected utility despite the decline in compensation. The intuition is analogous 
to purchasing an insurance contract: the policyholder’s benefit from the reduction in risk outweighs 
the cost of the insurance premium (which is analogous to a CEO’s reduction in total compensation). 
Column (6) shows that the decline in total annual compensation is also attributable to a 
reduction in equity compensation. Column (7) reports estimates for EquityMix and suggest that the 
proportion of CEOs’ compensation paid in the form of stock and options is decreasing in their 
treatment intensity. Together with the results in the first five columns, this finding indicates that 
more treated CEOs receive relatively less total annual compensation following the introduction of 
weather derivatives and relatively less of their compensation in the form of equity (i.e., restricted 
                                                 
24 We obtain similar results when we jointly estimate the two equations for cash and equity compensation using 
seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) (Zellner, 1962), which accommodates correlation between the residuals of the 
two equations. We estimate SUR using the Stata command SUREG. Since this STATA routine does not allow for 
clustering of standard errors, we use bootstrapped standard errors. 
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stock and options). This finding is also consistent with firms intentionally substituting away from 
equity incentives.  
5.2.2. CEO equity portfolio incentives 
Table 3 presents the results of estimating our models of CEOs’ equity portfolio incentives. 
The first column examines how the introduction of weather derivatives affected the sensitivity of 
CEOs’ equity portfolio values to changes in stock price, or Portfolio Delta. The coefficient on 
After*Treatment is negative and statistically significant, indicating that the magnitude of CEOs’ 
equity incentives is decreasing in the intensity of their treatment following the introduction of 
weather derivatives (t-statistic of -4.30). We find similar results for Portfolio Vega: the coefficient 
on After*Treatment is negative and significant (t-statistic of -3.05). The coefficient estimates in 
columns (1) and (2) suggest that a one standard deviation increase in treatment intensity results in 
an 18.6% decline in CEO equity incentives following the introduction of weather derivatives.   
An auxiliary prediction is that risk-averse executives should be willing to hold their options 
longer following the introduction of weather derivatives because of the reduction in their exposure 
to firm risk (Hemmer, Matsunaga, and Shevlin, 1996). We construct a variable, Unex/Total, 
defined as the ratio of the Black-Scholes value of vested in-the-money options to the value of all 
vested options, to measure the timeliness of CEOs’ option exercise. Consistent with our prediction, 
we find that CEOs’ tendency to hold a larger relative proportion of vested in-the-money options 
following the introduction of weather derivatives is increasing in their treatment intensity. 
Combined with the change in granting behavior by the board, this finding suggests that the 
reduction in CEOs’ Portfolio Vega for higher levels of treatment intensity is attributable to boards 
re-optimizing the executives’ compensation contracts in light of the changes in firm risk. Moreover, 
coupled with our finding that firms with greater historical exposure to weather risk experience 
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significant reductions in risk following the introduction of weather derivatives, our finding that 
their executives’ equity incentives also declined is evidence of a positive, rather than a negative 
relation between risk and incentives.  
5.3. Fuzzy difference-in-differences 
To the extent that firms imperfectly comply with treatment, traditional (or “sharp”) 
difference-in-differences may not accurately capture the magnitude of the relation between 
controlling weather risk and CEO compensation and incentives. Instead, difference-in-differences 
provides an ITT estimate that does not match the treatment effect. Therefore, we estimate the effect 
of controlling weather risk on compensation contracts using fuzzy difference-in-differences. 
We use Beta-FF as our primary measure of firms’ exposure to weather risk and note that 
we obtain similar results when we use the other measures of weather risk exposure from Table 1, 
Panel D. We report the estimates of the first-stage regression given by Eq. (2a) in Column (1) of 
Table 4. The coefficient on After*Treatment is negative and significant at the 1% level, suggesting 
that the instrument relevance assumption (Assumption 6) is satisfied. In addition, the first-stage F-
statistic of 27.25 is well above the recommended minimum value of ten (Stock and Yogo, 2005).25 
The results from estimating Eq. (2b) presented in Column (2) to (9) of Table 4 continue to show a 
positive relation between controllable risk and executives’ incentives and compensation.  
The coefficient estimates from the fuzzy difference-in-differences specification are 
equivalent to those from the traditional difference-in-differences specification scaled by the 
relative proportion of compliers in the sample. The LATEs imply that a one standard deviation 
increase in treatment intensity results in a 12% relative decrease in total compensation, a 25.6% 
                                                 
25 More precisely, Stock and Yogo (2005) show that if the first-stage F-statistic for all instruments is greater than ten, 
the maximum bias of the instrumental variables estimator will be less than 10%. Subsequent work has adopted the 
“rule of thumb” that first-stage F-statistics greater than ten are acceptable (Roberts and Whited, 2010, 516). 
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relative decrease in equity compensation, a 20.5% relative decrease in Portfolio Delta, and 21.6% 
relative decrease in Portfolio Vega following the introduction of weather derivatives.26 The test 
statistics associated with the fuzzy difference-in-differences estimates are similar to their 
counterparts from the traditional difference-in-differences because fuzzy difference-in-differences 
scales both the coefficient estimates and the standard errors by the same constant—namely the 
relative proportion of compliers from the first-stage.27 Consequently, in this and subsequent tables 
we only examine variants of those specifications from prior tables in which our coefficients of 
interest were statistically significant.  
 
6. Sensitivity Analyses 
 We conduct several supplemental analyses to assess the sensitivity our primary inferences 
to our maintained identifying assumptions outlined in Section 3.  
6.1. Evaluating the parallel trends assumption 
Inferences from both difference-in-differences specifications rely on the maintained 
assumption that, absent the treatment, both treated and control firms would have continued to 
exhibit similar trends in the outcomes of interest (Assumption 1). They also rely on the assumption 
that firms did not adjust their pre-treatment outcomes in anticipation of receiving the treatment 
(Assumption 3). To assess the validity of these assumptions, we examine whether firms with 
                                                 
26 While it is possible that a reduction in cost of hedging can directly affect compensation contracting, we do not 
believe this drives our results. It is difficult to see why an exogenous reduction in hedging costs, absent changes in the 
amount or controllability of risk, would lead to a change—and, in particular, a reduction—in executive pay or 
incentives. Further, we show that the changes in incentives and pay that we document vary predictably with the 
changes in firm risk (this is an explicit advantage of our fuzzy difference-in-differences design). Finally, since we 
control for return on assets throughout our analyses, any change in firm performance due to a reduction in hedging 
costs should be captured by this control. 
27 Note that the standard errors of the fuzzy difference-in-differences estimator are adjusted to reflect the use of 
predicted rather than observed variables in the second-stage. This adjustment has a modest effect on the standard 
errors. 
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relatively high and low exposures to weather exhibit parallel trends before the introduction of 
weather derivatives. To do so, we estimate a specification that is analogous to Eq. (1), except that 
we replace the After indicator with separate indicators for each of the two years preceding, the year 
of, and the two years following the introduction of weather derivatives: After(t=-2), After(t=-1), 
After(t=0), After(t=1) and After(t>=2).28  
We present the results of this specification in Table 5. None of the pre-event variables are 
significant at conventional levels, consistent with our maintained assumption that firms did not 
change their hedging behavior in anticipation of the introduction of weather derivatives. This also 
suggests that firms with relatively high and low exposures to the weather had similar trends prior 
to the introduction of weather derivatives.  
6.2. Establishment-level measure of weather exposure 
To the extent that utilities have diverse operations that span multiple different geographic 
regions, measuring weather risk exposure at the headquarter location will introduce measurement 
error.  To address this concern, we re-estimate firms’ weather risk exposure using more granular 
data from the National Establishment Time Series (NETS) database.29 We use the Publicly Listed 
Companies Database from NETS, which tracks all establishments of publicly-listed firms in the 
U.S. and provides an identifier that links each establishment to its ultimate parent entity, which we 
manually match to the Compustat database.  
                                                 
28 An alternative would be to assess the parallel trends assumption using a modified fuzzy difference-in-differences 
model. However, such a test would produce larger standard errors and lead to an increased risk of Type I errors. 
Because this test is an attempt to falsify the parallel trends assumption by finding evidence of differential pre-treatment 
trends, an increased risk of Type I errors would bias this test towards incorrectly failing to reject the parallel trends 
assumption. 
29 The NETS database was jointly developed by Walls and Associates and Dun and Bradstreet and provides sales and 
location information of all domestic establishments on an annual basis. Dun and Bradstreet spends millions of dollars 
each year to ensure the accuracy and integrity of the NETS data.  
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The NETS data allows us to directly measure firms’ exposure to weather risk at each of 
their individual establishments. We do so by modifying Eq. (3) to estimate the sensitivity of 
revenue to local weather conditions at each of the firm’s establishments: 
Revijt/Assetsit = β0,i + β1,i EDDijt+ γ1,i ln(Assetsit) + γ2,i ln(Employeeijt)+εijt         (6)                 
where i refers to firms, j refers to the firm’s establishments, t refers to time, and Revijt/Assetsit is 
the revenue of each establishment scaled by the firm’s total ending assets. EDD is as previously 
defined, but measured at establishment j. The NETS database does not provide information on 
establishment size, so we use the natural logarithm of the number of employees (ln(Employee)) at 
each establishment as an alternative proxy to control for variation in revenue attributable to 
differences in establishment size. In addition, we control for the size of the firm as a whole 
(ln(Assets)). 
We estimate Eq. (6) separately for each firm in our sample using annual data from 1990 to 
1997. We require each firm to have at least 20 establishment-year observations to obtain a reliable 
coefficient estimate. Our estimation period starts in 1990 because this is the first year that NETS 
data are available. The coefficient β1 captures the sensitivity of revenue to variation in energy 
demand accounting for geographic dispersion in the firm’s operations both within and across states. 
We re-estimate our main specification with this alternative measure of weather exposure and the 
results in Table 6 show that our inferences are unchanged. 
6.3. Summary of sensitivity analyses 
We also report and describe in detail several additional sensitivity analyses in Appendix II. 
We show that state-level industry deregulation is unlikely to drive our results by re-estimating our 
main tests after including state of location and year joint fixed effects and after including state of 
incorporation and year joint fixed effects. To ensure our results are not confounded by the adopting 
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of SFAS 133 (Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities), we estimate our 
main tests in the three-year window around 1997. To ensure our results are not driven by the 
replacement or turnover of existing CEOs in response to weather derivatives changing the skills 
that firms desire from CEOs, we estimate our main tests including CEO fixed effects. Finally, we 
estimate our main tests using an alternative measure of exposure to weather conditions based on 
firm profits. We find that our inferences are largely unchanged by these alternative specifications. 
6.4. Who benefits from hedging? 
Our finding in Table 1, Panel D that firms use weather derivatives to reduce idiosyncratic 
risk suggests that hedging may increase firm value through a mechanism other than the direct 
effect of reducing firm risk.30 Perez-Gonzalez and Yun (2013) find that hedging weather risk 
increases firm value by allowing increased leverage and investment. We provide evidence of 
another channel through which hedging can increase firm value. In particular, our results suggest 
that hedging also reduces agency frictions with non-diversified executives and employees who are 
exposed and averse to idiosyncratic risk, leading to a lower risk premium and the ability to more 
efficiently rely on lower-powered incentives, which are less costly.  
In Appendix II, we report and describe in detail several additional analyses designed to 
provide corroborating evidence that hedging is not driven by executives hedging purely for agency 
reasons or the result of shareholders directly valuing hedging because of the resulting decrease in 
idiosyncratic risk. First, we show that the relation between treatment and using weather derivatives 
to reduce exposure to weather risk is stronger for firms with higher quality governance, as 
                                                 
30 However, even if hedging primarily reduces priced risk, it should not explain why hedging increases firm value 
(Smith, 2008). This is because hedging with derivatives should not alter—and, in particular, reduce—the total amount 
of systematic risk which, by definition, must be borne by someone. Instead, weather derivatives merely allow the 
contracting parties to shift systematic risk between one another. As long as the parties to the derivative contract price 
the systematic risk correctly, derivative hedging cannot be a positive NPV project via the reduction in systematic risk 
alone. Given the depth and active nature of the derivative markets, we believe it is unlikely they are systematically 
inefficient.  
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measured by the presence of dedicated institutional investors. This finding suggests that hedging 
is not a symptom of unresolved agency problems between executives and shareholders. Second, 
we show that the relation between treatment and using weather derivatives to reduce exposure to 
weather risk is not attenuated at firms with more shareholders. This finding is inconsistent with 
shareholders valuing hedging for reducing their exposure to idiosyncratic risk.  
 
7. Conclusion 
 We examine how the controllability of risk influences the design of executives’ incentive-
compensation contracts. We find that the CEOs of utility firms with greater historical exposure to 
weather risk receive relatively less total annual compensation following the introduction of 
weather derivatives. This finding is consistent with the notion that weather derivatives allow 
executives to hedge risk that they would otherwise have to bear and, consequently, they receive 
less of a risk premium in their annual compensation. We also document a significant decline in 
these CEOs’ equity incentives following the introduction of weather derivatives, which indicates 
that controllable risk and incentives have a complementary relation. These results provide 
important empirical evidence about the theoretically ambiguous relation between risk and 
incentives, and suggests the relation depends on whether risk is controllable (Edmans and Gabaix, 
2011a; Hemmer, 2006, 2012). Overall, our results show that firms’ risk-profiles and hedging 
opportunities affect the design and structure of CEOs’ incentive-compensation contracts. 
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Appendix I 
Variables Definitions 
Variable Definition 
WeatherDeriv Use 
Dummy equal to one if quarterly and annual reports filed by our sample firms contain any of the 
following keywords: “Weather Derivative”, “Cooling Degree Day”, “Heating Degree Day”, “CDD” 
and “HDD.” If a firm-year’s reports do not contain these hedging keywords, we classify that firm-
year as nonuser. 
Beta-FF 
For each firm-year, we regress daily stock return on Fama-French 3-factor model and daily EDD. 
EDD is the sum of daily CDD and HDD, which are calculated as Max{0, 65-½*(Tmax+Tmin)} and 
Max{0, ½*(Tmax+Tmin)-65}, respectively. Tmax and Tmin are the maximum and minimum daily 
temperature measured in degrees Fahrenheit, respectively. Beta-FF is the absolute value of the 
estimated coefficient on EDD. 
Risk-FF Beta-FF multiplied by volatility of EDD. 
Beta-FFM 
For each year each firm, we regress daily stock return on Carhart 4-factor model and daily EDD. 
EDD is the sum of daily CDD and HDD, which are calculated as Max{0, 65-½*(Tmax+Tmin)} and 
Max{0, ½*(Tmax+Tmin)-65}, respectively. Tmax and Tmin are the maximum and minimum daily 
temperature measured in degrees Fahrenheit, respectively. Beta-FFM is the absolute value of the 
estimated coefficient on EDD. 
Risk-FFM Beta-FFM multiplied by volatility of EDD. 
Log Ret Vol Log of stock return volatility. 
Log Idio Vol-FFM 
Log of idiosyncratic volatility, where idiosyncratic volatility is the volatility of the residuals from a 
regression of stock return volatility on the Carhart (1997) four factors. 
Log Total Comp Log of total compensation. 
Log Cash Comp Log of salary and bonus.  
Log Salary Log of salary compensation. 
Log Bonus Log of bonus compensation. 
Log LTIP Log of long-term incentive pay. 
Log Equity Comp Log of the value of restricted stock grants plus the value of option grants. 
Equity Mix Value of restricted stock grants plus the value of option grants / total compensation.  
Portfolio Vega 
Log of the dollar change in wealth associated with a 0.01 change in the standard deviation of the 
firm’s returns. Obtained from Coles et al (2013). 
Portfolio Delta 
Log of the dollar change in wealth associated with a 1% change in the firm’s stock price. Obtained 
from Coles et at (2013). 
Unex/Total 
Value of  in-the-money unexercised exercisable options divided by the total value of unexercised 
and exercised options 
Log Assets Log of total assets. 
Log Firm Age Log of firm age, where firm age is the number of years since the firm first appears in CRSP. 
Log Stock Return Log of one plus stock return over the fiscal year. 
ROA Net income plus extraordinary items and discontinued operation scaled by lagged total asset. 
Book-to-Market Book value over market value of equity. 
Leverage Sum of short- and long-term debt minus cash holdings scaled by total assets.  
CAPEX Total capital expenditure scaled by total assets. 
After Dummy equal to one for observations from 1998 onwards and zero otherwise 
After(t=-2) 
Dummy equal to one if it is two years prior to the introduction of weather derivatives and zero 
otherwise. 
After(t=-1) 
Dummy equal to one if it is one year prior to the introduction of weather derivatives and zero 
otherwise. 
After(t=0) 
Dummy equal to one if it is the year during which weather derivatives are introduced and zero 
otherwise. 
After(t=1) 
Dummy equal to one if it is one year after the introduction of weather derivatives and zero 
otherwise. 
After(t>=2) 
Dummy equal to one if it is two or more years after the introduction of weather derivatives and zero 
otherwise. 
Treatment 
We use a continuous treatment variable, which is defined as the pre-event sensitivity of stock revenue 
to weather fluctuations. Following Perez-Gonzalez and Yun (2013), we estimate the following 
specification: Rev/Assetsit = β0,i + β1,i EDDit+ γi ln(Assetsit) + εit, where Rev/Assetsit is quarterly 
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revenue scaled by total assets. EDD is the sum of daily CDD and HDD for each quarter, which are 
calculated as Max{0, 65-½*(Tmax+Tmin)} and Max{0, ½*(Tmax+Tmin)-65}, respectively. Treatmentit is 
defined as the product of the absolute value of the estimated beta (|𝛽1|̂ ) and the historical standard 
deviation of EDD (𝜎𝐸𝐷𝐷) during the 1980-1997 estimation period, multiplied by 100.  
Treatment(Profit) 
We use a continuous treatment variable, which is defined as the pre-event sensitivity of profit to 
weather fluctuations. We estimate the following specification: Profit/Assetsit = β0,i + β1,i EDDit+ γi 
ln(Assetsit) + εit, where Profit/Assetsit is quarterly income before extraordinary items scaled by total 
assets. EDD is the sum of daily CDD and HDD for each quarter, which are calculated as Max{0, 65-
½*(Tmax+Tmin)} and Max{0, ½*(Tmax+Tmin)-65}, respectively. Treatmentit is defined as the product of 
the absolute value of the estimated beta (|𝛽1|̂ ) and the historical standard deviation of EDD (𝜎𝐸𝐷𝐷) 
during the 1980-1997 estimation period, multiplied by 100. 
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Figure 1  
Example 10-K Discussion of a Weather Derivative Contract 
 
 
On October 5, 2006, Washington Gas purchased a new HDD derivative designed to 
provide full protection from warmer-than-normal weather in Virginia during the 
upcoming 2006-2007 winter heating season. Washington Gas will receive $25,500 for 
every HDD below 3,735 during the period October 15, 2006 through April 30, 2007.  
- Excerpt from Washington Gas Light Co.’s 2007 Annual Report (Form 10-K) 
This contract was based on the number of HHDs, which is the contractual measure of the 
underlying weather outcome. The contract covered the period October 15, 2006 through April 30, 
2007 (essentially the winter of 2006-07) and had an exercise (or “strike”) price of 3,735. If the 
winter had been warmer than usual, Washington Gas would have received $25,500 for each HDD 
below the strike price. The winter of 2006-07 turned out to be colder than usual, and the actual 
HDD was 3,955, which exceed the contract’s strike price. Accordingly, Washington Gas was not 
entitled to any payment from this particular weather derivative, and the contract expired worthless. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
The sample period is from 1993 to 2002. All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
Panel A: Weather Risk 
  N Mean Std Median 25th Pctle 75th Pctle 
Beta-FF 899 0.75 0.86 0.49 0.22 0.96 
Beta-FFM 899 0.75 0.90 0.48 0.22 0.93 
Risk-FF 899 7.37 6.85 5.35 2.57 9.99 
Risk-FFM 899 7.34 7.02 5.26 2.39 10.17 
Log Ret Vol 899 0.37 0.39 0.24 0.08 0.60 
Log Idio Vol-FFM 899 0.27 0.39 0.24 -0.02 0.49 
Treatment 899 2.22 2.94 1.01 0.41 2.11 
 
Panel B: CEO Incentive-Compensation Measures 
Panel B1: Our Sample  Panel B2: Execucomp Excluding Utilities 
  N Mean Std Median 25th  Pctle 75th  Pctle    N Mean Std Median 25
th  Pctle 75th  Pctle 
Cash Comp 899 849.28 484.31 738.20 512.21 1033.60  Cash Comp 13674 1148.99 1044.63 837.33 514.18 1385.70 
Equity Comp 899 592.60 1187.12 152.21 0.00 604.34  Equity Comp 13748 2190.40 4340.58 669.22 72.49 2139.18 
Total Comp 899 1841.82 2318.41 1148.66 712.58 2025.74  Total Comp 13748 4261.02 12162.88 1880.68 946.59 4132.77 
Equity Mix 899 0.22 0.22 0.15 0.00 0.37  Equity Mix 13725 0.39 0.30 0.39 0.08 0.64 
Portfolio Delta 840 3.44 1.42 3.45 2.46 4.42  Portfolio Delta 12713 5.37 1.56 5.32 4.38 6.33 
Portfolio Vega 868 2.27 1.86 2.61 0.00 3.80  Portfolio Vega 13396 3.41 1.64 3.56 2.50 4.55 
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics, Continued 
 
Panel C: Firm Characteristics 
Panel C1: Our Sample  Panel C2: Compustat Excluding Utilities 
  N Mean Std Median 25th Pctle 75th Pctle    N Mean Std Median 25th Pctle 75th Pctle 
CEO Tenure 899 6.43 3.78 6.00 4.00 8.00  CEO Tenure 13817 8.32 6.91 7.00 4.00 10.00 
Total Assets 899 7543.32 8859.48 3865.97 1780.81 9688.06  Total Assets 98770 1817.53 7249.15 104.33 18.92 548.04 
Firm Age 899 48.63 11.50 48.00 44.00 52.00  Firm Age 99052 12.85 12.85 8.00 4.00 16.00 
Stock Return 899 0.10 0.27 0.09 -0.06 0.25  Stock Return 68778 0.10 0.67 0.00 -0.30 0.33 
ROA 899 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.05  ROA 89329 -0.18 0.81 0.01 -0.10 0.07 
Book-to-Market 899 0.67 0.24 0.62 0.53 0.75  Book-to-Market 85201 0.55 1.25 0.51 0.24 0.89 
Leverage 899 0.37 0.08 0.36 0.32 0.41  Leverage 98254 0.10 0.48 0.09 -0.14 0.33 
CAPEX 899 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.07  CAPEX 98770 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.07 
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Table 1 
Panel D: Sensitivity of Equity Returns to Weather 
This Table presents the results of estimating the regression given by Equation (2a). The sample period is from 1993 to 2002. We use Hornstein and Greene’s (2012) 
method to account for the estimated (rather than observed) dependent variable in column (2) to (5). All variables are defined in the Appendix. Intercepts are included 
but unreported. t-statistics are presented below the coefficients in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance (two-sided) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and are clustered by firm and period (pre-1997/post-1997) level.  
 
    Fama French 3 Factor Model Carhart 4 Factor Model   Carhart 4 Factor Model 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 WeatherDeriv Use Beta-FF Risk-FF Beta-FFM Risk-FFM Total Risk Sys Risk Idio Risk 
                  
After*Treatment 0.02*** -0.04*** -0.42*** -0.03*** -0.41*** -0.03*** -0.02 -0.03*** 
 (3.06) (-5.22) (-5.09) (-5.20) (-5.11) (-3.07) (-1.37) (-3.06) 
Log CEO Tenure -0.01 -0.03 -0.25 -0.04 -0.31 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 
 (-0.30) (-0.80) (-0.56) (-0.94) (-0.71) (-0.76) (-0.64) (-0.82) 
Log Assets 0.08* -0.00 0.18 -0.02 -0.08 0.09 0.18 0.08 
 (1.70) (-0.05) (0.24) (-0.29) (-0.11) (0.96) (1.34) (0.79) 
Firm Age -0.29** 0.61*** 4.81*** 0.64*** 5.01*** 0.21 -0.15* 0.23 
 (-2.18) (5.76) (4.00) (5.66) (3.97) (1.46) (-1.84) (1.60) 
Stock Return 0.03 -0.01 0.14 -0.02 -0.08 -0.51*** 0.13 -0.49*** 
 (0.85) (-0.10) (0.12) (-0.18) (-0.07) (-3.58) (0.66) (-3.44) 
ROA -0.44 -1.48** -12.70 -1.62** -14.39* -4.52*** -1.18 -4.42*** 
 (-1.46) (-2.38) (-1.61) (-2.58) (-1.76) (-3.94) (-0.82) (-3.76) 
Book-to-Market 0.02 -0.02 -0.33 0.03 0.23 0.44 -0.30 0.43 
 (0.45) (-0.11) (-0.19) (0.21) (0.13) (1.61) (-0.87) (1.51) 
Leverage -0.73*** 0.07 0.24 0.05 0.20 0.34 0.51 0.36 
 (-3.12) (0.21) (0.06) (0.15) (0.05) (0.71) (0.74) (0.77) 
CAPEX 0.05 0.60 5.48 0.72 7.09 0.30 -0.30 0.41 
 (0.14) (1.04) (0.85) (1.26) (1.09) (0.43) (-0.24) (0.59)          
         
Observations 899 899 899 899 899 899 899 899 
R-squared 0.49 0.40 0.33 0.40 0.32 0.71 0.74 0.65 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 2 
CEO Compensation 
This Table presents the results of estimating the regressions given by Eq. (1). The sample period is from 1993 to 2002. All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
Intercepts are included but unreported. t-statistics are presented below the coefficients in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance (two-sided) at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and are clustered by firm and period (pre-1997/post-1997) level. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Log Total Comp Log Cash Comp Log Salary Log Bonus Log LTIP Log Equity Comp Equity Mix 
                
After*Treatment -0.04*** -0.02*** -0.01 -0.07* 0.05 -0.09** -0.01*** 
 (-4.13) (-3.16) (-1.45) (-1.91) (1.20) (-2.12) (-4.14) 
Log CEO Tenure 0.05 0.07** 0.10*** -0.09 0.23 -0.68** -0.06*** 
 (0.90) (2.31) (4.12) (-0.58) (0.87) (-2.37) (-3.26) 
Log Assets 0.08 0.11 0.06 -0.48 0.90** -0.31 -0.02 
 (0.57) (1.31) (0.55) (-1.13) (2.10) (-0.49) (-0.44) 
Firm Age 0.33*** 0.15** 0.14 0.45 0.84*** -0.05 0.04 
 (3.81) (2.44) (1.33) (1.54) (2.90) (-0.13) (1.38) 
Stock Return 0.28** 0.17** -0.11** 2.14*** 0.78 1.10** 0.03 
 (2.13) (2.56) (-2.32) (5.15) (1.61) (2.27) (0.80) 
ROA 2.11* 1.77** 0.27 11.38*** 3.64 5.11 0.24 
 (1.76) (2.55) (0.26) (3.17) (1.05) (1.13) (0.61) 
Book-to-Market -0.03 -0.20** -0.08 -0.82 -1.19** 0.24 0.01 
 (-0.13) (-2.10) (-0.56) (-1.39) (-2.05) (0.28) (0.11) 
Leverage 0.11 -0.27 0.14 -3.47** -1.59 -1.24 0.06 
 (0.24) (-1.13) (0.56) (-2.42) (-1.20) (-0.60) (0.34) 
CAPEX 1.15 1.19** 0.81 3.87 5.28 -3.07 -0.15 
 (1.39) (2.36) (1.30) (1.57) (1.57) (-0.82) (-0.52) 
        
Observations 899 899 899 899 899 899 899 
R-squared 0.77 0.83 0.76 0.53 0.57 0.53 0.49 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 3 
CEO Equity Portfolio Incentives 
This Table presents the results of estimating the regressions given by Eq. (1). The sample period is from 1993 to 2002. 
All variables are defined in the Appendix. Intercepts are included but unreported. t-statistics are presented below the 
coefficients in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance (two-sided) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and are clustered by firm and period (pre-1997/post-
1997) level. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Portfolio Delta Portfolio Vega Unex/Total 
        
After*Treatment -0.07*** -0.07*** 0.01* 
 (-4.30) (-3.05) (1.95) 
Log CEO Tenure 0.23** -0.00 -0.03 
 (2.00) (-0.01) (-1.23) 
Log Assets 0.37** 0.42 -0.03 
 (2.20) (1.12) (-0.84) 
Firm Age 0.97*** 0.18 -0.10 
 (6.55) (0.74) (-1.57) 
Stock Return 0.19 -0.22 0.01 
 (0.87) (-1.08) (0.24) 
ROA -0.60 1.26 -0.18 
 (-0.52) (0.44) (-0.49) 
Book-to-Market -0.37 -0.67 -0.15** 
 (-0.63) (-1.61) (-2.03) 
Leverage 0.35 -0.30 0.11 
 (0.44) (-0.28) (0.83) 
CAPEX 0.85 1.39 -0.18 
 (0.78) (0.64) (-0.54)     
Observations 840 868 899 
R-squared 0.75 0.75 0.83 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 4 
Fuzzy Difference-in-Differences 
This Table presents the second stage results of estimating the fuzzy difference-in-differences regressions given by Eqs. (2a) and (2b).The results of the first stage 
regressions are reported in Column (1) . Pred Beta-FF is the predicted weather beta from the first stage regression. The sample period is from 1993 to 2002. All 
variables are defined in the Appendix. Intercepts are included but unreported. t-statistics are presented below the coefficients in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance (two-sided) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and are clustered by firm and 
period (pre-1997/post-1997) level. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Beta-FF Log Total Comp Log Cash Comp Log Bonus Log Equity Comp Equity Mix Portfolio Delta Portfolio Vega Unex/Total 
                   
After*Treatment -0.04***         
 (-5.22)         
Pred Beta-FF  0.64*** 0.32*** 1.21* 1.47* 0.21*** 1.22*** 1.22** -0.13* 
  (3.52) (2.77) (1.86) (1.92) (3.48) (3.21) (2.41) (-1.90) 
Log CEO Tenure -0.03 0.08 0.08** -0.03 -0.61* -0.05** 0.40*** 0.03 -0.03 
 (-0.80) (1.20) (2.39) (-0.20) (-1.97) (-2.24) (3.37) (0.22) (-1.33) 
Log Assets -0.00 0.07 0.11 -0.50 -0.34 -0.02 0.47* 0.33 -0.03 
 (-0.05) (0.36) (0.98) (-0.99) (-0.46) (-0.38) (1.95) (0.71) (-0.76) 
Firm Age 0.61*** -0.01 -0.02 -0.19 -0.82 -0.07 0.44 -0.48 -0.03 
 (5.76) (-0.04) (-0.15) (-0.40) (-1.46) (-1.26) (1.12) (-0.92) (-0.34) 
Stock Return -0.01 0.53*** 0.30*** 2.62*** 1.68*** 0.12** 0.61** 0.15 -0.04 
 (-0.10) (3.02) (2.87) (4.56) (2.95) (2.05) (2.18) (0.51) (-0.71) 
ROA -1.48** 3.34** 2.39** 13.72*** 7.94 0.64 1.66 4.11 -0.43 
 (-2.38) (1.99) (2.46) (3.08) (1.40) (1.16) (0.77) (1.07) (-0.92) 
Book-to-Market -0.02 0.05 -0.16 -0.67 0.42 0.03 -1.22** -0.51 -0.17* 
 (-0.11) (0.16) (-1.03) (-0.75) (0.38) (0.31) (-2.21) (-0.80) (-1.66) 
Leverage 0.07 0.12 -0.26 -3.46** -1.22 0.06 0.37 -0.13 0.11 
 (0.21) (0.18) (-0.80) (-2.13) (-0.48) (0.24) (0.29) (-0.09) (0.69) 
CAPEX 0.60 1.25 1.25* 4.07 -2.82 -0.12 1.24 1.62 -0.20 
 (1.04) (1.00) (1.68) (1.34) (-0.62) (-0.28) (0.61) (0.56) (-0.61) 
                    
Observations 899 899 899 899 899 899 839 868 899 
R-squared 0.40 0.49 0.67 0.38 0.39 0.03 0.54 0.55 0.80 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 5 
Evaluating the Parallel Trends Assumption 
This Table presents the results of estimating the difference-in-differences regressions given by the modified Eq. (1) described in Section 6.1. The sample period is 
from 1993 to 2002. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Intercepts are included but unreported. t-statistics are presented below the coefficients in parentheses. 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance (two-sided) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and are 
clustered by firm and period (pre-1997/post-1997) level. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Log Total Comp Log Cash Comp Log Bonus Log Equity Comp Equity Mix Portfolio Delta Portfolio Vega Unex/Total 
                 
After(t=-2)*Treatment -0.00 -0.00 -0.02 0.06 -0.00 -0.03 -0.01 0.01 
 (-0.06) (-0.57) (-0.54) (0.71) (-0.32) (-1.31) (-0.55) (0.68) 
After(t=-1)*Treatment 0.00 -0.01 -0.04 0.02 0.00 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 
 (0.21) (-0.97) (-0.73) (0.28) (0.11) (-1.38) (-0.77) (0.85) 
After(t=0)*Treatment -0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.13 -0.01*** -0.02 -0.06** 0.01 
 (-0.23) (0.31) (0.20) (-1.43) (-2.81) (-1.25) (-2.09) (1.55) 
After(t=1)*Treatment -0.04** -0.01 -0.11* -0.06 -0.01 -0.06*** -0.05 0.01 
 (-2.03) (-1.53) (-1.74) (-0.71) (-1.21) (-2.85) (-1.42) (1.10) 
After(t>=2)*Treatment -0.04** -0.03** -0.07 -0.12* -0.02*** -0.10*** -0.11*** 0.01*** 
 (-2.46) (-2.59) (-1.21) (-1.92) (-4.43) (-4.37) (-3.29) (2.69) 
Log CEO Tenure 0.05 0.07** -0.09 -0.69** -0.07*** 0.22* -0.01 -0.02 
 (0.88) (2.25) (-0.56) (-2.38) (-3.37) (1.94) (-0.09) (-1.13) 
Log Assets 0.08 0.11 -0.48 -0.30 -0.02 0.37** 0.43 -0.04 
 (0.57) (1.32) (-1.12) (-0.47) (-0.40) (2.21) (1.13) (-0.88) 
Firm Age 0.33*** 0.15** 0.45 -0.01 0.04 0.98*** 0.20 -0.11 
 (3.81) (2.46) (1.54) (-0.03) (1.49) (6.63) (0.81) (-1.63) 
Stock Return 0.28** 0.18*** 2.13*** 1.10** 0.04 0.21 -0.20 0.01 
 (2.10) (2.62) (4.99) (2.27) (0.83) (0.92) (-0.96) (0.20) 
ROA 2.12* 1.78** 11.28*** 5.33 0.27 -0.54 1.37 -0.19 
 (1.76) (2.54) (3.13) (1.16) (0.67) (-0.47) (0.47) (-0.49) 
Book-to-Market -0.03 -0.20** -0.82 0.22 0.01 -0.37 -0.68 -0.15** 
 (-0.14) (-2.09) (-1.39) (0.26) (0.08) (-0.63) (-1.62) (-2.00) 
Leverage 0.11 -0.27 -3.47** -1.22 0.06 0.33 -0.32 0.12 
 (0.23) (-1.13) (-2.42) (-0.59) (0.33) (0.42) (-0.30) (0.84) 
CAPEX 1.14 1.16** 4.03 -3.31 -0.19 0.79 1.24 -0.16 
 (1.36) (2.26) (1.62) (-0.89) (-0.65) (0.72) (0.57) (-0.49) 
                  
Observations 899 899 899 899 899 840 868 899 
R-squared 0.77 0.83 0.53 0.54 0.49 0.75 0.76 0.83 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 6 
Establishment-level Measure of Weather Exposure 
This Table presents the second stage results of estimating the fuzzy difference-in-differences regressions given by the modified Eqs. (2a) and (2b) described in 
Section 6.2. Pred Beta-FF(NETS) is the predicted weather beta from the first stage regression. The sample period is from 1993 to 2002. All variables are defined 
in the Appendix. Intercepts are included but unreported. t-statistics are presented below the coefficients in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance 
(two-sided) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and are clustered by firm and period (pre-1997/post-
1997) level. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Log Total Comp Log Cash Comp Log Bonus Log Equity Comp Equity Mix Portfolio Delta Portfolio Vega 
                
Pred Beta-FF 0.99*** 0.52*** 3.18*** 1.94 0.28*** 1.58*** 1.13* 
 (3.18) (2.65) (3.16) (1.57) (2.76) (2.76) (1.75) 
Log CEO Tenure 0.09 0.09** 0.02 -0.60* -0.05* 0.41*** 0.03 
 (1.08) (2.03) (0.07) (-1.84) (-1.89) (2.97) (0.21) 
Log Assets 0.06 0.10 -0.55 -0.35 -0.03 0.45 0.33 
 (0.27) (0.79) (-0.78) (-0.46) (-0.37) (1.62) (0.76) 
Firm Age -0.18 -0.12 -1.18 -1.06 -0.11 0.26 -0.43 
 (-0.71) (-0.65) (-1.40) (-1.38) (-1.40) (0.51) (-0.82) 
Stock Return 0.67*** 0.38*** 3.40*** 1.87*** 0.15** 0.72** 0.13 
 (2.93) (2.63) (3.99) (2.66) (2.06) (2.01) (0.40) 
ROA 4.01* 2.78** 17.53*** 8.84 0.78 2.38 3.88 
 (1.91) (2.26) (2.64) (1.38) (1.22) (0.87) (1.02) 
Book-to-Market 0.10 -0.14 -0.43 0.48 0.04 -1.17* -0.52 
 (0.21) (-0.60) (-0.27) (0.39) (0.32) (-1.71) (-0.86) 
Leverage 0.16 -0.24 -3.21 -1.16 0.07 0.43 -0.16 
 (0.19) (-0.53) (-1.19) (-0.42) (0.24) (0.28) (-0.11) 
CAPEX 1.19 1.21 3.72 -2.90 -0.13 1.27 1.63 
 (0.74) (1.28) (0.76) (-0.59) (-0.26) (0.51) (0.58)         
        
Observations 899 899 899 899 899 839 868 
R-squared 0.10 0.41 0.39 0.30 0.31 0.33 0.58 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Appendix II 
 
A.1. Review of the theoretical literature on risk and incentives 
Empirical contracting studies that predict a negative relation between risk and incentives 
typically appeal to Holmstrom (1979) and Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987).31 Holmstrom (1979) 
and Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) model the principal’s problem as one of designing a contract 
that balances the benefit of increasing the sensitivity of the agent’s pay to the performance measure 
(i.e., improved incentive alignment) against the cost of imposing more risk on a risk-averse and 
undiversified agent. A more restrictive version of these models features a linear compensation 
contract, negative exponential utility, and a normally distributed performance measure with a mean 
that is a deterministic function of the agent’s (personally costly) action and an exogenous variance 
(or “noise”). The benefit of this so-called LEN framework is that its highly-stylized—but arguably 
unrealistic—assumptions are sufficiently tractable to produce a closed-form solution for the 
optimal (second-best) contract. However, the model is tractable because it places severe 
restrictions on the contracting environment, the implications of which empirical contracting 
studies often ignore (Lambert, 2001). 
For example, the stylized model assumes that the performance measure (e.g., stock price) 
equals the agent’s action plus a normally distributed error that is mean zero and has a constant, 
exogenous variance. This additive error structure implies that the executive’s action affects only 
the mean of the performance measure and has no effect on higher moments. However, Hemmer 
                                                 
31 Prendergast (2002) surveys the empirical incentive-contracting literature and documents the widespread prevalence 
of the belief that risk and incentives should share a negative relation. He also develops a model that predicts a positive, 
rather than a negative relation between risk and incentives. His model highlights the tradeoff between incentives and 
monitoring and shows how a principal might want to rely more on incentives when there is greater uncertainty in the 
operating environment (i.e., risk) and monitoring the executive’s inputs (e.g., effort) is relatively costlier than 
observing output (e.g., firm performance). Although our results are largely consistent with Prendergast’s (2002) 
predictions, we do not explicitly test for a substitution from incentives to monitoring following a decrease in risk. 
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(2002, 2006) highlights that the mean and variance of distributions with a lower bound (e.g., the 
price of a stock with limited liability) are usually positively correlated. Consequently, actions that 
increase the mean of the performance measure also increase its variance. By allowing both the 
mean and the variance (or risk) of performance to endogenously depend on the executive’s action, 
Hemmer (2006) shows that risk and incentives will have a positive relation if stronger incentives 
are required to elicit greater effort. 
Another unattractive implication of assuming that the performance measures’ mean and 
variance are uncorrelated is that the agent’s action has a deterministic effect on the performance 
measure. However, it is unrealistic to assume that the agent knows for certain how his actions 
affect expected performance because this link is likely subject to at least some—if not 
substantial—uncertainty. For example, it is more difficult to disentangle the effects of an agent’s 
actions on firm performance from the effects of other factors that are beyond the agent’s control 
in more uncertain environments. As Meulbroek (2000) explains, just as “rowing does not affect [a] 
boat’s progress very much relative to the effect of a hurricane,” risk that is beyond an agent’s 
control reduces the agent’s willingness to exert effort for a given level of incentives. Consequently, 
more incentives are required to offset a weaker link between effort and performance, leading to a 
positive relation between risk and incentives.32  
A.2. Can CEOs increase expected utility by hedging? 
 Using both traditional and fuzzy difference-in-differences designs, we find that CEOs’ use 
of weather derivatives to hedge their firm’s exposure to weather risk is increasing in their firm’s 
historical exposure to weather risk and, consequently, these CEOs receive less total annual 
                                                 
32 Conversely, reducing the amount of risk that is beyond an executive’s control can result in the need for less 
incentives because each “unit” of incentives reflect the executive’s actions with greater precision, so fewer “units” of 
incentives are required to elicit the desired level of effort.  
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compensation and have lower equity incentives. It may seem puzzling that CEOs would make a 
choice that results in lower compensation. However, undiversified and risk-averse executives trade 
off the risk of their compensation and wealth against the amount of compensation when 
maximizing their expected utility. Hedging allows CEOs to reduce their firm’s—and, in turn, their 
own—exposure to a source of risk that is outside of their control, the benefit of which can offset 
the associated loss of compensation. In this section, we develop a numerical model that attempts 
to quantify the effects of hedging on CEOs’ utility.  
We follow Lambert et al. (1991) and consider a risk-averse CEO with preferences 
represented by the power utility function, U(w) = w(1-a)/(1-a), where w is the CEO’s terminal 
wealth and a is the CEO’s coefficient of relative risk aversion. w0 denotes the CEO’s initial wealth, 
n denotes the number of stock options with exercise price k, q denotes the number of shares, and 
δ denotes firm risk. We can write the CEO’s end of period wealth as: 
w (δ, n, q) = w0 + n * Max{s(δ) - k, 0} + q*s(δ) 
Where s(δ) is the firm’s end of period stock price, which is a function of the firm’s risk controllable 
by the CEO. s(δ) is assumed to follow a lognormal distribution with location and scale parameters 
of µ and δ. Therefore, the mean and variance of the stock price are both functions of µ and δ and, 
by construction, positively correlated. The CEO chooses δ, which dictates the firm’s risk and 
expected return, to maximize expected utility from his terminal wealth. For a given level of initial 
wealth, w0, and equity portfolio, the CEO’s problem of choosing δ to maximize expected utility is 
as follows: 
EU*(δ, w0, n, k, q) = Max
δ
E[u(w(δ, w0, n, k, q))]  
which has the following certainty equivalent value  
CE (δ, w0, n, k, q) =[(1-a) EU*(δ, w0, n, k, q)]1/(1-a) 
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We solve the CEO’s optimization problem numerically since the non-linear payoff of the options 
precludes a closed-form solution. 
Figure A1 illustrates the effect of decreasing risk on the CEO’s certainty equivalent. We 
plot changes in the certainty equivalent value of the CEO’s risky portfolio against changes in 
expected utility for a 0.5% reduction in firm risk. Consistent with the intuition that CEOs trade off 
the amount of compensation with the risk of that compensation, Figure A1 shows that changes in 
the certainty equivalent of compensation are a non-linear function of changes in utility when risk 
is decreasing. For relatively high levels of risk, a 0.5% reduction in firm risk results in an increase 
in the certainty equivalent of compensation and utility. However, for relatively low levels of firm 
risk, a further reduction in risk results in a reduction in the CEO’s certainty equivalent and an 
increase in the CEO’s utility. In total, Figure A1 shows that hedging can increase CEOs’ expected 
utility despite the decline in compensation. The net effect on utility depends on the tradeoff 
between risk and compensation. 
A.3 Sensitivity analyses 
 In this section, we describe in detail several analyses summarized in the main text. 
A.3.1. State-level industry deregulation and changing business prospects and policies 
Electricity in the U.S. was traditionally supplied by regional monopolies that owned both 
the power plants and the transmission lines used to distribute power. Because of their monopoly 
power, states tended to rely on heavy regulation of utilities, setting their rate of return based on 
their cost of services. Deregulation was triggered by a series of federal actions, which were 
followed by the passage of state laws ordering the separation of power plants from the distribution 
facilities. The Energy Policy Act of 1992 was the first act to curb utilities’ monopolies by 
expanding the Federal Energy Regulation Commission’s (FERC) authority. On April 24, 1996, 
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the FERC issued Order 888, a landmark ruling that required utilities to open their power 
transmission lines to independent producers. FERC’s intent was to introduce competition at the 
wholesale level and prevent utilities from using their control of the transmission system to limit 
the entry of lower priced generation.  
The primary result of Order 888 was to force many states to deregulate the utility industry, 
due to concerns that interstate competition would price out regulated monopolies. By 2000, 24 
states had passed laws to deregulate their utility industries. However, during the next eight years, 
ten states had repealed or delayed their deregulation laws, mainly as a response to the California 
Energy Crisis of 2000-01.33 By 2008, there were only twelve U.S states where utility industries 
were completely deregulated.  
To mitigate concerns that our results might be confounded by the effects of state-level 
industry deregulation, we re-estimate our main tests after including state of location and year joint 
fixed effects. After including these additional fixed effects, the resulting specification estimates 
the difference between firms with different treatment intensities located in the same state at the 
same point in time, and therefore subject to the same state regulations. These additional fixed 
effects ensure that any observed treatment effect is due solely to the differences in treatment (i.e., 
the introduction of weather derivatives) rather than any concurrent regulatory or state economic 
effects. The results of this analysis, presented in Panel A of Table A1, continue to show a positive 
relation between controllable risk and executives’ incentives and compensation.   
                                                 
33 The 24 states that deregulated are Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, New Jersey, New 
Hampshire, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, 
Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhodes Island, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia. By 2008, the following ten states 
had repealed or delayed their deregulation laws: Arkansas, Arizona, Illinois, New Mexico, Nevada, Michigan, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, Virginia, and West Virginia. 
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A related concern is that changes in state policies or rulings might affect firms based on 
their state of incorporation rather than their state of location. To address this related concern, we 
include state of incorporation and year joint fixed effects. The resulting specification compares 
firms with different treatment intensities that are incorporated in the same state at the same point 
in time. We present the results of this analysis in Panel B of Table A1. Again, the coefficient on 
Pred Beta-FF remains largely unchanged. We conclude that our results are not driven by changes 
in state economics or regulations. 
A.3.2. SFAS133 adoption and shorter event windows 
 The choice of any particular sample period in a difference-in-differences analysis entails a 
cost-benefit tradeoff. The benefits of a longer window are twofold. First, a larger window uses 
more data to estimate the pre- and post-treatment relationship, which, in turn, produces more 
powerful statistical tests. Second, a wider window allows more time for both boards’ contracting 
decisions and executives’ risk-taking decisions to take effect and manifest in the data. The cost of 
using a wider window is that it increases the likelihood of capturing differential trends that are 
unrelated to the event of interest. Therefore, we explore the sensitivity of our inferences to the 
choice of event window. 
Examining a shorter window also allows us to examine the possibility that our results are 
confounded by the adoption of SFAS 133 (Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging 
Activities). SFAS 133 establishes accounting and reporting standards for derivative instruments 
and requires an entity to recognize all derivatives as either assets or liabilities on its statement of 
financial position and to measure derivative instruments at their fair value.34 The standard became 
                                                 
34  SFAS 133 arguably made the accounting treatment of hedges more complicated, burdensome, and costly to 
implement. It requires firms to recognize all derivatives as either assets or liabilities on the statement of financial 
position and measure those instruments at their fair value rather than their notional value. Several studies examine the 
relevance of SFAS 133 to risk management activities and document mixed evidence. For example, Singh (2004) and 
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effective for fiscal years beginning after June 15, 2000. Using a three-year event window around 
1997 reduces the risk that our results are due to any potential confounding effects from the adoption 
of SFAS 133. 
We tabulate the results of estimating our main tests when using a three-year event window 
in Table A2. The second-stage results continue to indicate a positive relation between controllable 
risk and executives’ incentives and compensation. We conclude that our inferences are robust to 
the choice of a shorter event window and are unlikely to be an artefact of the adoption of SFAS 
133. 
A.3.3. CEO attributes 
The introduction of weather derivatives could change the skills that the boards and 
shareholders of utility firms desire from CEOs, implying that our results could be driven by the 
turnover and replacement of existing CEOs. We conduct several additional tests to address 
concerns that our results are attributable to differences in CEO ability and styles driven by turnover. 
We first exclude 72 firms associated with 90 CEO turnover events that occurred during our sample 
period. In untabulated results, we find that our inferences are robust to excluding these firms from 
the sample.  
Next, we re-estimate our main specifications after including CEO fixed effects, in addition 
to firm and year fixed effects. CEO fixed effects absorb time-invariant features of CEO ability and 
preferences (e.g. risk aversion) and limit our analysis to within-CEO, within-firm variation. 
Therefore, introducing these fixed effects controls for any changes in the identity of CEOs. We 
present the results of this analysis in Table A3 and find that our inferences remain unchanged. We 
                                                 
Park (2004) find no significant change in earnings volatility following the adoption of SFAS 133, while Zhang (2009) 
finds that some firms changed their risk management activities following the adoption of SFAS 133. 
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conclude that our results are not an artefact of CEO turnover or changes in the desired skills of 
CEOs.  
A.3.4. Alternative measure of weather exposure 
 Our primary measure of historical weather exposure is based on the sensitivity of firms’ 
revenue to weather. However, it is possible that weather can affect firms’ cost structures. For 
example, extremely cold weather could increase the maintenance and repair costs of gas 
distribution pipelines. Therefore, we assess the robustness of our results to an alternative measure 
of firms’ exposure to weather risk based on fluctuations in their profitability, which should 
incorporate both the revenue and cost implications of abnormal weather conditions.35 To do so, we 
re-estimate Eq. (3) using quarterly profit as the dependent variable: 
                Profit/Assetsit = β0,i + β1,i EDDit+ γi ln(Assetsit) + εit                                  (5) 
where Profit/Assetsit is quarterly income before extraordinary items scaled by ending total assets. 
We estimate the equation separately for each firm in our sample using quarterly Compustat data 
from 1980 to 1997, and we require each firm to have at least 40 quarterly observations. The 
estimated coefficient β1 captures the sensitivity of a firm’s profit to variation in energy demand. 
Our alternative definition of treatment, Treatment(Profit), is defined as the product of the absolute 
value of the estimated beta (|𝛽1|̂ ) and the historical standard deviation of EDD (𝜎𝐸𝐷𝐷), multiplied 
by 100. We present the results of re-estimating Eqs. (2a) and (2b) using this alternative definition 
                                                 
35 We obtain similar results when we define Treatment based on cost structure. Specifically, we estimate Eq. (3) using 
cost as the dependent variable: Cost/Assetsit = β0,i + β1,i EDDit+ γi ln(Assetsit) + εit, where Cost/Assetsit is quarterly 
COGS scaled by ending total assets. We estimate the equation separately for each firm in our sample using quarterly 
Compustat data from 1980 to 1997, and we require each firm to have at least 40 quarterly observations. The estimated 
coefficient β1 captures the sensitivity of a firm’s cost structure to variation in energy demand. Our alternative definition 
of treatment, Treatment(Cost), is defined as the product of the absolute value of the estimated beta (|𝛽1|̂ ) and the 
historical standard deviation of EDD (𝜎𝐸𝐷𝐷), multiplied by 100. We then re-estimate Eqs. (2a) and (2b) using this 
alternative definition of firms’ exposure to weather risk. Our results are largely unchanged (t-statistics on Pred Beta-
FF range from 1.68 to 3.36). 
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of weather exposure in Panel A of Table A4. Our results are largely unchanged and the unreported 
first-stage F-statistic on the excluded instrument remains well above ten.  
We also examine whether this measure of firms’ exposure to weather risk exhibits a 
violation of the parallel trends assumption. To do so, we replace After*Treatment with a series of 
pre- and post-treatment indicators and report the estimates from this alternative specification in 
Panel B of Table A4. None of the pre-treatment indicators is statistically significant at conventional 
levels, suggesting that the parallel trends assumption is not violated for this alternative measure. 
Collectively, we conclude that our inferences are robust to using an alternative definition of firms’ 
exposure to weather risk.  
A.3.5. Hedging and governance quality 
As further evidence that our findings are not explained by executives hedging purely for 
agency reasons, we include a measure of governance quality in Eq. (2a) and interact it with our 
treatment variables. If hedging provides private benefits to CEOs at the expense of shareholders, 
then we expect that the relation between treatment and hedging will be attenuated at firms with 
higher quality governance. Alternatively, if hedging reduces contractual frictions and benefits 
shareholders, then we expect the relation between treatment and hedging to be more pronounced 
at firms with higher quality governance. We measure governance quality using an indicator for 
whether the percentage of the firm’s shares held by dedicated institutional investors is above the 
sample median. Prior work suggests dedicated institutional investors have incentives to monitor 
and govern firms (e.g., Bushee, 1998; Chen et al., 2007). Moreover, this measure of governance 
quality is widely available for our sample firms. Estimates from this modified version of Eq. (2a) 
are reported in Table A5 and show that the relation between treatment and using weather 
derivatives to reduce exposure to weather risk is stronger for firms with higher quality governance. 
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This finding is inconsistent with hedging resulting from an agency conflict between executives 
and shareholders. 
A.3.6. Hedging and the number of shareholders 
As further evidence that our findings are not explained by shareholders directly valuing 
hedging because of the resulting reduction in idiosyncratic risk, we include a measure of 
shareholder diversification in Eq. (2a) and interact it with our treatment variables. If hedging is the 
result of shareholders directly valuing the reduction in idiosyncratic risk, then we expect 
shareholder diversification to attenuate the relation between treatment and hedging. Prior theory 
work argues that idiosyncratic risk is not diversified when there are a small number of shareholders 
(i.e., relatively low risk-bearing capacity), and can hence affect firms’ equity market value (e.g., 
Hughes et al., 2007; Lambert et al., 2007). Consequently, we use an indicator for whether the 
number of shareholders is above the sample median to measure shareholder diversification (e.g., 
Armstrong et al., 2011). We present the results of estimating this modified Eq. (2a) in Table A6. 
We find that, if anything, the relation between treatment and using weather derivatives to reduce 
exposure to weather risk is amplified, rather than attenuated when there are a large number of 
shareholders. This finding is inconsistent with hedging resulting from shareholders directly 
valuing the decrease in idiosyncratic risk. 
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Figure A1 
 
 
 
This figure plots the changes in certainty equivalent of compensation against changes in utility given 0.5% decline in 
return volatility. Our model parameter choice follows Lambert, Larcker and Verrecchia (1991). The CEO is assumed 
to have power utility with a coefficient of relative risk aversion of two. We assume that the CEO receives 10,000 
options with an exercise price equal to the stock price at the time of grant at $50. We assume that the firm’s stock 
price return follows a lognormal process with mean of 10% and we allow return volatility to vary from 30% to 1%. 
The proportion of CEO’s other wealth that is tied to stock price is assumed to be 90%.   
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Table A1 
Changes in Business Prospects and Policies  
This Table presents the second stage results of estimating the fuzzy difference-in-differences regressions given by the modified Eqs. (2a) and (2b) described in 
Section A.3.1. Pred Beta-FF is the predicted weather beta from the first stage regression. The sample period is from 1993 to 2002. All variables are defined in the 
Appendix. Intercepts are included but unreported. t-statistics are presented below the coefficients in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance (two-
sided) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and are clustered by firm and period (pre-1997/post-1997) 
level. 
 
Panel A: Control for Local Business Conditions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Log Total Comp Log Cash Comp Log Bonus Log Equity Comp Equity Mix Portfolio Delta Portfolio Vega 
                
Pred Beta-FF 0.65*** 0.28** 0.50* 2.06** 0.21*** 0.79*** 0.52 
 (2.83) (2.09) (1.77) (2.23) (2.77) (2.76) (1.02) 
Log CEO Tenure -0.07 0.03 -0.15 -1.27*** -0.12*** 0.07 -0.32 
 (-0.75) (0.51) (-0.66) (-2.91) (-3.55) (0.59) (-1.62) 
Log Assets 0.10 0.10 -0.41 -0.02 -0.02 0.57** 0.31 
 (0.37) (0.66) (-0.50) (-0.03) (-0.23) (2.55) (0.64) 
Firm Age -0.40 -0.14 0.40 -3.12** -0.25** 0.33 -1.22* 
 (-1.19) (-0.70) (0.46) (-2.42) (-2.38) (1.02) (-1.78) 
Stock Return 0.77*** 0.43*** 2.88*** 1.87* 0.14 0.36 -0.09 
 (2.69) (2.77) (3.53) (1.88) (1.44) (1.11) (-0.21) 
ROA 2.82 1.85* 9.02** 8.04 0.72 0.20 1.68 
 (1.43) (1.79) (2.33) (1.08) (1.08) (0.09) (0.42) 
Book-to-Market 0.09 -0.04 -0.07 -0.68 -0.06 -1.73*** -1.00 
 (0.16) (-0.15) (-0.07) (-0.38) (-0.37) (-3.07) (-1.47) 
Leverage -0.61 -0.41 -2.83 -5.71 -0.28 -0.10 -1.24 
 (-0.65) (-0.87) (-1.38) (-1.47) (-0.80) (-0.10) (-1.26) 
CAPEX 3.25 2.03 6.53 2.02 0.51 2.15 1.47 
 (1.58) (1.61) (1.45) (0.28) (0.79) (0.85) (0.37) 
                
Observations 899 899 899 899 899 840 868 
R-squared 0.66 0.80 0.67 0.55 0.36 0.84 0.83 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location-Year Joint FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table A1 Cont’d 
Panel B: Control for Changes at State of Incorporation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Log Total Comp Log Cash Comp Log Bonus Log Equity Comp Equity Mix Portfolio Delta Portfolio Vega 
                
Pred Beta-FF 1.02*** 0.40*** 0.90 2.52* 0.25** 0.81** 1.10* 
 (3.57) (2.83) (1.00) (1.91) (2.37) (2.21) (1.75) 
Log CEO Tenure -0.00 0.04 -0.33 -1.14*** -0.11*** 0.09 -0.20 
 (-0.03) (0.81) (-1.38) (-2.84) (-3.56) (0.87) (-1.17) 
Log Assets -0.06 -0.00 -0.92 -0.53 -0.01 0.74*** 0.10 
 (-0.18) (-0.02) (-1.35) (-0.49) (-0.08) (4.12) (0.15) 
Firm Age -0.44 -0.18 -0.41 -2.70* -0.19 0.51 -1.02 
 (-0.97) (-0.83) (-0.40) (-1.81) (-1.63) (1.51) (-1.32) 
Stock Return 0.81** 0.47*** 3.51*** 1.49 0.08 0.28 -0.03 
 (2.53) (2.83) (4.53) (1.42) (0.88) (0.91) (-0.07) 
ROA 4.55 2.24 10.02** 13.37 1.09 0.62 5.82 
 (1.49) (1.48) (2.04) (1.39) (1.29) (0.27) (1.07) 
Book-to-Market 0.41 0.09 0.84 -0.42 -0.01 -1.59*** -0.69 
 (0.64) (0.33) (0.67) (-0.22) (-0.08) (-2.83) (-0.77) 
Leverage -0.48 -0.40 -4.31** -5.25 -0.15 -0.17 -1.58 
 (-0.39) (-0.74) (-2.03) (-1.28) (-0.42) (-0.17) (-0.99) 
CAPEX 2.61 1.82 7.95* -0.93 -0.09 0.22 1.00 
 (0.90) (1.29) (1.82) (-0.11) (-0.12) (0.09) (0.20)         
        
Observations 899 899 899 899 899 840 868 
R-squared 0.36 0.70 0.62 0.45 0.22 0.84 0.74 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Incorporation-Year Joint FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table A2 
SFAS 133 Adoption and Shorter Event Window 
This Table presents the second stage results of estimating the fuzzy difference-in-differences regressions given by the modified Eqs. (2a) and (2b) described in 
Section A.3.2. Pred Beta-FF is the predicted weather beta from the first stage regression. The sample period is from 1995 to 2000. All variables are defined in the 
Appendix. Intercepts are included but unreported. t-statistics are presented below the coefficients in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance (two-
sided) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and are clustered by firm and period (pre-1997/post-1997) 
level. 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Log Total Comp Log Cash Comp Log Bonus Log Equity Comp Equity Mix Portfolio Delta Portfolio Vega 
                
Pred Beta-FF 0.68*** 0.32** 1.79** 1.53* 0.15** 0.58** 0.67 
 (3.14) (2.60) (2.30) (1.75) (2.40) (1.99) (1.57) 
Log CEO Tenure -0.07 0.01 -0.45 -1.10*** -0.09*** 0.34*** -0.08 
 (-0.75) (0.14) (-1.35) (-2.98) (-3.06) (2.89) (-0.41) 
Log Assets -0.11 -0.03 -1.06 -0.69 -0.03 0.53*** 0.12 
 (-0.47) (-0.24) (-1.43) (-0.86) (-0.42) (2.98) (0.24) 
Firm Age -1.45*** -0.61*** -0.99 -7.02*** -0.55*** -0.03 -0.68 
 (-4.37) (-3.50) (-0.96) (-6.78) (-6.15) (-0.10) (-0.91) 
Stock Return 0.33* 0.13 1.87*** 0.79 0.04 0.30 -0.17 
 (1.73) (1.15) (2.80) (1.41) (0.83) (1.35) (-0.56) 
ROA 4.45** 2.50** 13.76** 10.01 0.71 0.67 4.83 
 (2.17) (2.02) (2.23) (1.58) (1.21) (0.38) (1.16) 
Book-to-Market 0.20 -0.15 -0.26 0.59 0.05 -1.11*** -0.13 
 (0.70) (-0.96) (-0.21) (0.57) (0.67) (-3.13) (-0.29) 
Leverage 0.25 -0.27 -3.22 -3.60 -0.10 -0.97 -2.16 
 (0.38) (-0.65) (-1.31) (-1.44) (-0.47) (-1.05) (-1.58) 
CAPEX 0.31 1.08 4.54 -3.66 -0.28 0.59 0.68 
 (0.14) (0.90) (0.71) (-0.57) (-0.48) (0.29) (0.19)         
        
Observations 569 569 566 569 569 531 549 
R-squared 0.58 0.74 0.36 0.54 0.40 0.82 0.72 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table A3 
CEO Attributes 
This Table presents the second stage results of estimating the fuzzy difference-in-differences regressions given by the modified Eqs. (2a) and (2b) described in 
Section A.3.3. Pred Beta-FF is the predicted weather beta from the first stage regression. The sample period is from 1993 to 2002. All variables are defined in the 
Appendix. Intercepts are included but unreported. t-statistics are presented below the coefficients in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance (two-
sided) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and are clustered by firm and period (pre-1997/post-1997) 
level. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Log Total Comp Log Cash Comp Log Bonus Log Equity Comp Equity Mix Portfolio Delta Portfolio Vega 
                
Pred Beta-FF 0.55*** 0.27** 1.12 1.81* 0.15** 0.64** 0.85* 
 (2.98) (2.57) (1.53) (1.93) (2.16) (2.13) (1.65) 
Log CEO Tenure -0.03 0.02 -0.29 -0.58 -0.09** 0.36* 0.04 
 (-0.29) (0.39) (-0.67) (-1.01) (-1.99) (1.83) (0.15) 
Log Assets 0.30 0.26** 0.35 0.68 0.06 0.64*** 0.76 
 (1.61) (2.51) (0.54) (0.88) (0.98) (2.97) (1.64) 
Firm Age 0.03 0.15 -0.09 -1.67 -0.05 0.79*** 0.24 
 (0.10) (0.87) (-0.12) (-0.92) (-0.43) (2.66) (0.80) 
Stock Return 0.42** 0.23** 2.25*** 1.67*** 0.07 0.35* -0.08 
 (2.45) (2.32) (3.86) (2.74) (1.31) (1.68) (-0.30) 
ROA 2.59** 2.12*** 12.44** 4.06 0.26 1.44 1.48 
 (2.06) (3.05) (2.60) (0.67) (0.51) (1.17) (0.47) 
Book-to-Market -0.18 -0.21 -0.87 0.66 0.01 -1.31*** -0.83 
 (-0.48) (-1.22) (-0.76) (0.46) (0.06) (-3.12) (-1.38) 
Leverage -0.47 -0.60 -5.04** -3.09 -0.02 0.24 0.38 
 (-0.64) (-1.39) (-2.27) (-1.00) (-0.07) (0.22) (0.24) 
CAPEX 1.56 1.28* 4.93 2.12 0.07 1.76 1.31 
 (1.32) (1.82) (1.40) (0.43) (0.17) (1.23) (0.56)         
        
Observations 899 899 874 899 899 840 868 
R-squared 0.86 0.89 0.47 0.67 0.61 0.83 0.85 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CEO FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table A4 
Alternative Measure of Weather Exposure 
This Table presents the second stage results of estimating the fuzzy difference-in-differences regressions given by the modified Eqs. (2a) and (2b) described in 
Section A.3.4. Pred Beta-FF(Profit) is the predicted weather beta from the first stage regression. The sample period is from 1993 to 2002. All variables are defined 
in the Appendix. Intercepts are included but unreported. t-statistics are presented below the coefficients in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance 
(two-sided) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and are clustered by firm and period (pre-1997/post-
1997) level. 
 
Panel A: Difference-in-Differences 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Log Total Comp Log Cash Comp Log Bonus Log Equity Comp Equity Mix Portfolio Delta Portfolio Vega 
                
Pred Beta-FF(Profit) 0.73*** 0.34*** 0.82 1.87** 0.23*** 1.35*** 1.13** 
 (3.31) (2.90) (1.22) (2.09) (3.16) (3.01) (2.17) 
Log CEO Tenure 0.08 0.08** -0.05 -0.60* -0.05** 0.41*** 0.03 
 (1.16) (2.37) (-0.28) (-1.86) (-2.13) (3.23) (0.21) 
Log Assets 0.07 0.11 -0.49 -0.35 -0.02 0.46* 0.33 
 (0.33) (0.96) (-1.04) (-0.46) (-0.38) (1.81) (0.74) 
Firm Age -0.05 -0.03 0.01 -1.02 -0.08 0.38 -0.43 
 (-0.27) (-0.22) (0.02) (-1.59) (-1.31) (0.85) (-0.86) 
Stock Return 0.57*** 0.31*** 2.46*** 1.84*** 0.12* 0.65** 0.13 
 (2.79) (2.77) (4.40) (2.82) (1.95) (2.07) (0.44) 
ROA 3.52* 2.42** 12.95*** 8.71 0.68 1.92 3.90 
 (1.97) (2.45) (3.04) (1.44) (1.19) (0.80) (1.03) 
Book-to-Market 0.06 -0.16 -0.72 0.47 0.03 -1.20** -0.52 
 (0.18) (-0.97) (-0.92) (0.39) (0.31) (-1.99) (-0.85) 
Leverage 0.13 -0.26 -3.51** -1.17 0.06 0.39 -0.16 
 (0.18) (-0.77) (-2.34) (-0.42) (0.24) (0.29) (-0.11) 
CAPEX 1.24 1.24 4.15 -2.89 -0.12 1.25 1.63 
 (0.92) (1.64) (1.50) (-0.60) (-0.27) (0.57) (0.58)         
        
Observations 899 899 899 899 899 839 868 
R-squared 0.40 0.65 0.46 0.31 -0.06 0.47 0.58 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table A4 (cont’d) 
Panel B: Event-Time Difference-in-Differences 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Log Total Comp Log Cash Comp Log Bonus Log Equity Comp Equity Mix Portfolio Delta Portfolio Vega 
                
After(t=-2)*Treatment(Profit) -0.11 -0.04 -0.24 -0.19 -0.04 -0.12 -0.05 
 (-1.36) (-0.96) (-0.87) (-0.46) (-1.28) (-1.27) (-0.44) 
After(t=-1)*Treatment(Profit) -0.09 -0.06 -0.01 -0.39 -0.03 -0.35 -0.14 
 (-0.95) (-1.05) (-0.04) (-0.80) (-0.70) (-1.60) (-1.22) 
After(t=0)*Treatment(Profit) -0.13 -0.02 0.02 -1.45*** -0.12*** -0.22* -0.47** 
 (-1.52) (-0.28) (0.06) (-2.78) (-3.47) (-1.77) (-2.57) 
After(t=1)*Treatment(Profit) -0.36*** -0.11** -0.58 -1.11** -0.08* -0.44*** -0.44* 
 (-3.42) (-2.11) (-1.39) (-2.10) (-1.86) (-3.08) (-1.90) 
After(t>=2)*Treatment(Profit) -0.34*** -0.17*** -0.25 -1.15*** -0.14*** -0.70*** -0.62*** 
 (-3.37) (-3.48) (-0.69) (-3.06) (-5.02) (-5.09) (-2.71) 
Log CEO Tenure 0.04 0.06** -0.08 -0.71** -0.07*** 0.35*** -0.01 
 (0.81) (2.16) (-0.48) (-2.46) (-3.51) (3.86) (-0.10) 
Log Assets 0.07 0.11 -0.49 -0.33 -0.02 0.48*** 0.40 
 (0.49) (1.24) (-1.16) (-0.52) (-0.51) (3.18) (1.06) 
Firm Age 0.32*** 0.14** 0.42 -0.03 0.03 1.05*** 0.16 
 (3.72) (2.26) (1.50) (-0.09) (1.29) (7.80) (0.65) 
Stock Return 0.29** 0.18*** 2.12*** 1.12** 0.04 0.28** -0.17 
 (2.17) (2.67) (4.99) (2.31) (0.94) (1.98) (-0.85) 
ROA 2.11* 1.79** 11.23*** 5.21 0.27 -0.56 1.37 
 (1.75) (2.54) (3.12) (1.14) (0.68) (-0.53) (0.47) 
Book-to-Market -0.00 -0.19* -0.80 0.29 0.01 -1.30*** -0.62 
 (-0.02) (-1.95) (-1.35) (0.34) (0.23) (-4.79) (-1.49) 
Leverage 0.10 -0.28 -3.56** -1.26 0.05 0.27 -0.34 
 (0.21) (-1.16) (-2.49) (-0.60) (0.30) (0.44) (-0.31) 
CAPEX 1.15 1.17** 4.22* -3.18 -0.19 0.74 1.37 
 (1.37) (2.27) (1.72) (-0.86) (-0.63) (0.77) (0.63) 
                
Observations 899 899 899 899 899 840 868 
R-squared 0.77 0.83 0.53 0.54 0.49 0.87 0.76 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table A5 
Hedging and Governance Quality 
This Table presents the results of estimating the regression given by Equation (2a), modified to include the interaction 
of High Ded with our treatment variables. The sample period is from 1993 to 2002. We use Hornstein and Greene’s 
(2012) method to account for the estimated (rather than observed) dependent variable in column (2) to (5). All 
variables are defined in the Appendix. Intercepts are included but unreported. t-statistics are presented below the 
coefficients in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance (two-sided) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and are clustered by firm and period (pre-1997/post-
1997) level.  
 
    Fama French 3 Factor Model Carhart 4 Factor Model 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 WeatherDeriv Use Beta-FF Risk-FF Beta-FFM Risk-FFM 
       
After*Treatment 0.02*** -0.03*** -0.31*** -0.03*** -0.31*** 
 (2.74) (-3.67) (-3.54) (-3.69) (-3.56) 
After*Treatment*High Ded 0.02 -0.09** -1.06*** -0.08** -0.95** 
 (1.65) (-2.57) (-2.62) (-2.33) (-2.39) 
After*High Ded -0.06 0.23 2.58 0.23 2.63 
 (-1.07) (1.48) (1.48) (1.48) (1.51) 
Treatment*High Ded -0.00 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.03 
 (-0.50) (0.62) (0.22) (0.51) (0.09) 
High Ded 0.01 0.01 0.29 0.01 0.29 
 (0.26) (0.11) (0.26) (0.12) (0.26) 
Log CEO Tenure -0.01 -0.04 -0.24 -0.04 -0.31 
 (-0.28) (-0.97) (-0.55) (-1.12) (-0.70) 
Log Assets 0.09* -0.00 0.13 -0.02 -0.13 
 (1.74) (-0.02) (0.18) (-0.26) (-0.18) 
Firm Age -0.28** 0.59*** 4.62*** 0.62*** 4.81*** 
 (-2.16) (5.56) (3.85) (5.44) (3.80) 
Stock Return 0.03 0.01 0.24 -0.00 0.01 
 (0.79) (0.08) (0.20) (-0.01) (0.01) 
ROA -0.47 -1.41** -11.08 -1.56** -12.78 
 (-1.55) (-2.28) (-1.44) (-2.50) (-1.59) 
Book-to-Market 0.02 -0.00 -0.34 0.05 0.23 
 (0.46) (-0.02) (-0.20) (0.31) (0.13) 
Leverage -0.74*** 0.11 0.52 0.09 0.50 
 (-3.18) (0.33) (0.13) (0.27) (0.13) 
CAPEX 0.07 0.58 4.68 0.71 6.46 
 (0.17) (1.02) (0.73) (1.27) (1.00)       
      
Observations 899 899 899 899 899 
R-squared 0.49 0.41 0.33 0.40 0.33 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table A6 
Hedging and the Number of Shareholders 
This Table presents the results of estimating the regression given by Equation (2a), modified to include the interaction 
of High Cshr with our treatment variables. The sample period is from 1993 to 2002. We use Hornstein and Greene’s 
(2012) method to account for the estimated (rather than observed) dependent variable in column (2) to (5). All 
variables are defined in the Appendix. Intercepts are included but unreported. t-statistics are presented below the 
coefficients in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance (two-sided) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and are clustered by firm and period (pre-1997/post-
1997) level.  
 
    Fama French 3 Factor Model Carhart 4 Factor Model 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 WeatherDeriv Use Beta-FF Risk-FF Beta-FFM Risk-FFM 
       
After*Treatment 0.01 -0.02* -0.18 -0.02** -0.19* 
 (1.57) (-1.78) (-1.64) (-1.98) (-1.78) 
After*Treatment*High Cshr 0.08*** -0.04 -0.53* -0.05* -0.62** 
 (2.79) (-1.43) (-1.82) (-1.87) (-2.27) 
After*High Cshr -0.10** 0.19** 2.42*** 0.16** 2.07** 
 (-2.57) (2.48) (2.90) (2.07) (2.54) 
Treatment*High Cshr -0.04** 0.03** 0.39** 0.03** 0.36** 
 (-2.03) (2.37) (2.14) (2.34) (2.11) 
High Cshr 0.09 -0.13** -1.26* -0.10* -0.93 
 (1.62) (-2.15) (-1.73) (-1.71) (-1.29) 
Log CEO Tenure -0.01 -0.02 -0.12 -0.03 -0.21 
 (-0.53) (-0.49) (-0.28) (-0.68) (-0.49) 
Log Assets 0.08* -0.01 0.04 -0.03 -0.20 
 (1.67) (-0.18) (0.05) (-0.35) (-0.26) 
Firm Age -0.28** 0.57*** 4.41*** 0.62*** 4.72*** 
 (-2.20) (5.51) (3.78) (5.42) (3.75) 
Stock Return 0.03 0.00 0.21 -0.01 -0.03 
 (0.75) (0.03) (0.17) (-0.09) (-0.03) 
ROA -0.47 -1.42** -11.89 -1.59** -13.78* 
 (-1.53) (-2.32) (-1.53) (-2.57) (-1.70) 
Book-to-Market 0.01 -0.01 -0.34 0.04 0.27 
 (0.10) (-0.06) (-0.20) (0.29) (0.15) 
Leverage -0.72*** -0.06 -0.93 -0.04 -0.68 
 (-3.03) (-0.18) (-0.23) (-0.13) (-0.17) 
CAPEX 0.02 0.58 5.24 0.72 6.88 
 (0.05) (0.98) (0.80) (1.23) (1.05)       
      
Observations 899 899 899 899 899 
R-squared 0.51 0.41 0.33 0.40 0.33 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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